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Arab Disappointment With Dayton Results Noted

LD2612120095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1147 GMT 26 Dec 95

["Pool" item; by Lea Vasiljevic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Cairo, Dec. 26 (TANJUG)—There is an increasing number of articles in the Arabic press that express bitter disappointment at the way the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has ended.

The articles are at the same time teeming with malicious comments suggesting that the Bosnian conflict might escalate again and give the works to western planners who, according to articles, have plotted an intrigue to prevent the setting up of an Islamic state in the 'heart of Europe.'

The Dayton peace accord for Bosnia has to a large extent revealed the true state of affairs in some parts of the Arabic world, showing that, very often, fundamentalists are not what they are believed to be—a kind of illegal opposition, removed from political affairs.

The three and a half years of civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina have helped extremists in Arabic states to strengthen their position at the domestic political scene by taking advantage of the worldwide anti-Serbian media campaign.

Agitating for the largest territory possible, an independent unitary state and economic powers for their brothers in religion, Bosnian Moslems, as well as for punishment of Serbs, arms deliveries to Moslems and their reinforcement with Islamic troops, extremists have for years been stepping up pressure on their local authorities.

Now that peace has been signed by Bosnia's three warring parties—Moslems, Croats and Serbs—those among Arabic journalists who until recently declared themselves as pacifists have been suddenly overcome by pessimistic feelings.

There are many such cases, especially as regards the press of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the two major points of the Arabic geographic triangle—the Gulf-the Middle East-Maghreb.

Hassan Tahsin, commentator of the Saudi GAZETTE daily, a paper with a high circulation, recently said peace in the Balkans would be characterised by cold relations.

He said Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic had looked sad at the moment when he had put his signature on the Bosnia peace accord in the Elysee presidential palace in Paris.

Izetbegovic was sad because he was well-aware of the intrigue through which the west had prevented the creation of an Islamic state in the heart of Europe, he said.

Tahsin tried to suggest that peace in Bosnia, as mapped out in Dayton, Ohio, in November, would not endure.

According to him, Bosnian Moslems are dissatisfied because they have been forced to share Bosnia-Herzegovina with their enemy, Serbs, 'whose victims they have been.'

To further support his thesis, Tahsin said Bosnian Serbs had also expressed dissatisfaction with some provisions of the Dayton peace accord.

Articles by Ahmad Zaki-Gulayd, another leading Arabic columnist, are much in the same vein. In a headline of one of its recent articles, Zaki-Gulayd accused those who have helped restore peace in Bosnia of disregarding the causes of the Bosnian conflict.

According to the Arabic press, proportional disarmament of the warring factions, democratic and fair elections, the problem of 2.8 million refugees and weak central authority are the links in the Dayton 'peace chain' that are bound to break sooner or later.

The prevailing view is that the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) will not manage to accomplish its task in just one year, despite the fact that the peace scenario has been planned so as to help U.S. President Bill Clinton win the next year's elections.

Effects of Serbian Economic Measures Viewed

AU2612135595 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian 19 Dec 95 p 2

[Article by I. Rexhepi: "Thirst for Foreign Currency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A great fuss has been made in publicizing what has been called Avramovic's Second Program; it has been proclaimed the salvation of Serbia and Montenegro, which are hoping to accomplish a speedy economic about-face following the suspension of sanctions. However, it does not in essence put forward anything new, but is merely the acceptance of a state of affairs that was present even before this December. What is new are hindrances to productions and a control on payments in all forms. First, the "new" balance between the dinar and the German mark, as it was one month ago, has been accepted. The reduction or removal of compulsory reserves for banks is merely a recognition of the fact that these reserves are now exhausted, and that fairly substantial funds have been consumed in the process. The liberalization of imports and exports has not been clearly defined, because no list of goods with concessions or barriers has been drawn up. Albanian businessmen now indeed report a much stricter regime for the traffic of goods between Kosova and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. It is said that customs charges now amount to 40 percent of the value of the goods. This means that Serbia and Montenegro found Macedonia useful as a transit point during the time of the embargo, and made customs duties merely symbolic, while now the customs system is becoming an obstruction to trade, implying a kind of new embargo against the new state of Macedonia.

No Benefits From Exports

It is well-known that a large number of enterprises in Kosova are dependent on the foreign market. Some sell their own products there, while others import raw materials and production equipment. Even though there is now a preconception that these enterprises will be in a favorable position following the suspension of sanctions, no speedy revival can be hoped for. The problem lies in very serious liquidity problems, which is not an economic issue, but a result of the violence of the regime in the last few years. The market has shrunk, because a large proportion of it is not an internal market any more, as it was before Yugoslavia's disintegration. The collapse of the banking system brought about by the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings against the Bank of Kosova left a large number of enterprises stranded without their financial institution. Much more seriously, the process of transformation carried out according to instructions from Belgrade robbed a large number of enterprises of their independence. Thus, without consulting the Albanian workforce, 12 public enterprises, or what might more simply be called state enterprises, were formed. Then, 238 enterprises were merged with enterprises in Serbia, thus losing all their rights. The current accounts of these enterprises are now controlled by some other outfit in Belgrade or Serbia. Even those small sums they earn are kept from them: hence the high degree of lack of liquidity.

Enterprises that remained unaffected, such as those in Gjakove [Djakovica], where the reforms were carried out in the interests of the workforce, have been out of production for three or four years now, because they have not been in any position to do more. Textile enterprises have been unable to export or to import. The timber industry has had no markets or investment. Elektromotor, despite its close ties with Slovene and Italian markets, has not been able to exploit this advantage. Can they now do something more? The problem is not confined to finding funds to start production. There are export problems. For instance, Elektromotor in Gjakove can export its products, because its former customers are still interested in their [illegible], but it is the central bank of the state calling itself Yugoslavia that benefits most. Any foreign currency earnings are paid into this bank, while the exporter is paid in dinars. If they need foreign currency, they must present themselves as purchasers on the market; in other words they have no priority as exporters. It is almost impossible to use loans for export, because these must be secured through a merchant bank. In this case, the bank issues money against security either in hard currency, fixed assets, or gold. No bank is today in a position to accept a security to be able to help its own founders, and it can least of all be expected that it would do such a thing for a Kosovar exporter. Meanwhile, the Economic Bank of Prishtina, even if it wished to help producers, has no chance of doing such a thing, because it can offer no loans, has no hard currency, no gold, and no business enterprise in its ownership.

Trepca and Ferronikel as Models

There is now a flood of information about the great work being done by such former giants of the Kosova mining and processing industries as Trepca and Ferronikel. The fact is that they do have something to put onto the world market. What they have to offer, on the basis of their performance six years ago, is highly attractive, and the price on the world market is favorable. The total occupation of Kosova, the sacking of Albanian workers, and then the transformations that have taken place, have created an opportunity for the Serbian occupying state to manage these enterprises according to their own interests. However, the idea that Trepca might earn

$120 million, as it did in 1989, or that Ferronikel at Gllogoc [Glogovac] might earn $100 million in foreign currency, as it did in its best years, may remain a dream. There is no production from the mines of Trepca, and only one furnace at Ferronikel is operating, because the other is entirely destroyed and several million dollars are necessary to reconstruct it. One may add to the list the Tube Factory at Ferizaj [Urosevac], which once earned about $30 million from exports; wine producers, who earned $10 million; and other exporters in different branches of industry. At the moment, hard-currency earnings remain a dream, because cooperation with foreign purchasers has come to an end, and producers have no stimulus for export.

The Serbian-imposed managers will aim at the highest possible exports in the knowledge that they are not helping their collectives in the least, but are meeting the interests of the Serbian state that gave them their jobs. Meanwhile private businessmen are unable to do anything spectacular, because they are now competing with great state enterprises that have privileged status in monetary, credit, and customs policies. At the same time, the deterioration of the balance of payments makes it necessary for everything to be handled by merchant banks, which means that any hard currency earnings are poured directly into the Central Bank of self-styled Yugoslavia. There is a danger that business conditions will become more difficult for many Albanian-owned private enterprises, because Serbia, knowing that the Albanians hold economic power in Kosova thanks to the capital they possess, will increase its repressive measures, stimulating and stepping up competition from state or public enterprises and from Serbian-owned private firms.

[Box, p 2]

Is There Bread?

The opening of borders and the announced liberalization of exports and imports will also jeopardize the Kosova market. The first signs are apparent in the most sensitive area—the flour and bread supply. There is no marked lack of these articles, and there have still been no great price increases. However, when we remember that the import of gas and oil from Russia for the needs of Serbia and Montenegro is conditional on the export of 3,500,000 tonnes of wheat, and that a large area in Kosova set aside for planting with wheat this year was not sown because of weather conditions, the signs for the proportion of the population whose livelihood is precarious are not good. There are no warnings of shortages of these items, but price increases are inevitable. Yesterday, the price of wheat reached 37 paras per kilogram on the Novi Sad exchange, or twice the guaranteed price. This is only a beginning. Albanian farmers must remember this and not leave their land fallow.

Republican Manifesto Deepens 'Conservative Spirit'

AU2612141795 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 21 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by A.V.: "Two-Chamber Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the threshold of the electoral campaign, the Republican Party [PR] has unfolded its new manifesto to the Albanian electorate. PR propaganda chief Gjok Beci said that this manifesto, which came off the printing press in Rome a few days ago, was approved by the PR National Council two months ago and is a result of the important economic, political, and social differences that have taken place in Albania in recent years. Beci said, "There are various changes in the PR's new manifesto, the first 10,000 copies of which came from Rome yesterday. These bring together several years of work by committees of PR representatives dealing with specific problems of Albanian society today." A deepening of the PR's conservative spirit, a legislative system with two chambers (a parliament and senate), maintaining capital punishment for serious crimes, and legal sanctions and punishments for those trading in women and children are some of the key changes. In their new program, the Albanian Republicans come out against homosexuality and abortion, except in cases when necessary for the mother's health.

Commentary Criticizes Weizsaecker's Speech

AU2212134195 Prague PRAVO in Czech 16 Dec 95 p 4

[Commentary by Vladimir Plesnik: "Weizsaecker Wanted To Make Everyone Happy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Richard von Weizsacker [former German president], a politician of refinement with a meditative philosopher's soul, has presented a paper to conclude a series of lectures entitled "Talks on Neighborhood." The last leading public personality from the Czech Republic and the FRG, he presented his views on how to form relations between Germany and the Czech Republic in the future.

Weizsaecker, now freed of the heavy burden of the presidential office, gave a flowery and deliberate speech so to make everyone happy. Well aware of the difficulties with the Czech-German declaration currently in the works, he intentionally avoided any mention of the Sudeten Germans (they were not mentioned even once) or Czech nationalism, something that did not at all displease the Bavarian and even some Bonn politicians.

"The attempt to draw a definite line after the bitter personal experience...is humane and realistic, if no unrealistic consequences are to be drawn from it for the future," Weizsaecker said. Not only this, he went even further. "All the parties involved are well aware that none of us is able to cast doubts on the existence of a neighboring state with its own political and legal system," he said, his words referring to the Sudeten Germans' demands for the return of their property or a settlement for its confiscation, the right to resettle in the Czech Republic, and the abrogation of the postwar amnesty on acts against the Germans.

With this, he gave a very clear picture of the sensitive point of the entire declaration. According to available sources, it seems that it is precisely this that is the limit that the Czech negotiators will not cross, however hard Bonn "presses on the saw." Since they are not politically suicidal, they really cannot go beyond this limit.

In the same breath, however, just several paragraphs later, the former FRG president spoke about a "solution to the still open questions of neighborly relations": One might ask what questions. What are the questions, still open, that are so important as to make the speaker mention them in general but, at the same time, would not lead him to cast any doubt on the legal system of the Czech Republic?

Like Klaus Kinkel, head of the German diplomacy, in the spring, or Bavarian Minister President Stoiber at any opportunity, Weizsaecker could not resist the temptation to return to the decision of the Czech Constitutional Court, which confirmed the validity of President Benes's decrees with all their correlations. True, unlike the first two, he did not call directly for them to be revised. Nevertheless, in a very cultivated manner and with diplomatic polish, he said that he "was very agitated by the decision of the Brno court because, after 50 years, it is still based on alleged collective responsibility and legitimizes the obvious wrongs of that time."

I respect Richard von Weizsaecker's directness, fortitude, and even willfulness with which he used to tell his people from the presidential palace the uncomfortable, occasionally bitter to sorrel-tasting truth straight in the face. The politicians of the German opposition social democrats and the Greens, above all Antje Vollmer, have appealed several times to Kohl's government not to tie the compensation of Czech victims of Nazism to Prague's accommodating approach to the demands of transferred Germans. Weizsaecker, a man who is sincerely interested in Czech-German reconciliation and is a courageous politician without time restriction, did not find this courage, however, in Karolinum Hall on Thursday.

Weekly Critical of Approach to German Talks

AU2112141095 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 11-17 Dec 95 No 50, p 2

[Commentary by Bohumil Dolezal: "Instead of Openness, Counting Dead Bodies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech-German talks on a joint declaration that should bring the difficult problems of the past to an end have been taking place at various levels since sometime in the spring. The Czech public receives less than modest and more than ambiguous reports on their progress. Should this declaration be issued by the governments or the parliaments? What is the current state of the talks less than a month before the end of the year and seven months before the Czech elections? Optimism has prevailed until now on the Czech side. (Only last Friday [8 December], Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec unexpectedly announced that "the key formulation that would state the will of the two sides not to burden future dialogue with the past is still not ready"—editor's note) The Germans, most recently the federal chancellor, were and are considerably more skeptical. Czech politicians (the prime minister some time ago and then the deputy chairman of parliament again) utter a few accommodating words from time to time and deny them soon afterwards. The atmosphere of fruitless secretiveness cannot, after all, but create the impression among many people that some sort of trick is being played on them.

Numbers Are Not Everything

The news that the joint Czech-German commission of historians had agreed on the number of victims of the "transfer" blared into this situation like victorious trumpet blasts: There were not 220,000 of them, as the Sudeten Germans maintain, but only 40,000. The Czech press reported this as if Czech diplomacy had managed to reduce our debt to the FRG from 220 billion marks to a mere 40 billion. In fact, there are not many reasons for rejoicing: 40,000 is still rather a fairly sizable number. (By the way, General Pinochet has 10 times fewer lives on his conscience, and, although his activity should not be excused, this figure places our revolutionaries of 1945-46 in the correct company.) But, even if not one hair on the head of any Sudeten German had been touched during the expulsion, it does not change anything in the overall monstrosity of this act.

It is hard to get rid of the feeling that attention is being diverted here, whether involuntarily or deliberately, from the significant issues to the less significant ones: What is indeed making haste is the political conclusion of the Sudeten-German issue. This means finding the kind of solution after which neither side will have a reason or the appetite to return to it on a political level. So, the situation will also be rid of its neurotic and hysterical ingredients, and the historians will then be able to devote themselves in a calm atmosphere to the sad events for as long as there is something to clarify in or add to them. Including such a morbid pastime as counting dead bodies.

Deportation and the Czech State's Interest

It also seems that the politicians are not clear about the nature of the problem. The recent speech by Minister Zieleniec in the Carolinium is a fitting example. After listening to it, it was easy to come to the conclusion that Czech-German relations are better than ever before: It is enough to simply ignore the Sudeten-German dilemma, which the minister talks about in his speech merely in obscure paraphrases that do not say anything. Yet, the speech is abundant in remarkable views on the futility of truth in politics and on the need for pragmatism there too. So, the notion is promoted gradually that condemning the "transfer" of the Sudeten Germans would mean "a moral judgment on Czech society" pronounced in the name of "eternal truths."

This is, of course, a big mistake. The issue in fact involves a rather down-to-earth political issue. For example, whether mass deportations, torture, and murders are regarded as an acceptable way of dealing with politically difficult situations. Of course, only under exceptional circumstances: But there is nothing easier than to create exceptional situations. One day it is a national conflict, in a couple of years it is a class conflict; the methods are the same—namely, those that had been factually legalized previously. And they are legalized to this day—viz. the recent decision by the Constitutional Court on the Dreithaler matter. It can also be said that tension in relations with our western neighbor does not benefit the Czech state's basic interests, especially its need for an internationally guaranteed and safe existence. Deportation, expropriation, and everything that accompanied them does not only come between us and Germany; the Hungarian minority in the CSR [Czechoslovak Republic] was also similarly affected. Czech unwillingness to come to terms with this one problematic element of our nation's past stamps our country with the hallmark of unreliability in the Central European region and contributes to Central Europe being justly viewed as an unstable dangerous area.

Scope for Vacuous Hogwash

This is chiefly a political issue and it is a very fundamental one. How we confront it will determine the nature of this state and its standing in the world for many years to come. Therefore, it is inconceivable that its resolution could be anything other than fundamental and absolutely open. It is definitely worth an open political conflict in which it is necessary to risk losses—that is, for example, losses in electoral support. The governing coalition is not even the slightest bit ready for this for, so to speak, "pragmatic" reasons. Practical policy, however, does not mean gallivanting all over the world, presenting one's political achievements, and collecting international awards for it. It also has its reverse difficult side, and everyone who assumes voluntarily the responsible tasks of a state official should take this into consideration.

Indeed, nothing here can be achieved by sly tricks, by quietly promoting a secretive policy along peripheral pathways. For those who have fundamental reservations against any kind of accommodating gesture in the Sudeten-German issue—parties such as the Association for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party, the Left Bloc, and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia—the Sudeten-German cudgel is a device in the battle for political power, and it is virtually the only device by which they will reach beyond the relatively narrow circle of their devoted supporters. If the governing coalition does not meet the Sudeten-German issue head on, they will do it for it with relish and in their own way as soon as the agreed upon text of the declaration becomes known.

The Czech Social Democratic Party is no less desirous of political power, and it is hardly possible to criticize it for this desire alone. Moreover, it risks the same loss of support as the governing parties. And it is hard to imagine how Milos Zeman, filled with altruism, will in such a delicate issue meet halfway the people who, as he is convinced deep down, deprived him some time ago of the deserved fruits of his political performance of the first half of 1990. Even here, forbearance cannot be reckoned with; the temptation is too great.

For the governing coalition to decide on a frontal and, frankly, confrontational approach, it would, of course, have to be clear about the nature of the issue and the importance of its resolution. It is plausible to be concerned that it is not clear: It lives too much in the lost paradise of the 1920's and 1930's, in fear of more or less fictitious dangers (the repeated Germanization of the border areas, the appropriation of "Czech" property).

In this situation, the political scope for a joint Czech-German declaration is minimal: Only vacuous hogwash will go into it, and the question is whether the German side will be willing to accede to something like this.

Comment: Parallels in Russia With Weimar Republic

AU2012174495 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 19 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Jaromir Stetina: "Weimar Parallels in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—In the wake of the parliamentary elections, the Russian intellectual elite has a new pastime: comparing the current situation in Russia with the period of the Weimar Republic (the pre-Hitler German Republic). There and here, a brief period of democracy; there and here, an unfortunate character for a president; and, then and now, the gray shadow of a loudmouth.

Russian voters have achieved an unusual feat: In democratic elections, they have elected to the forefront of their parliament two political parties that are intrinsically remote from democracy. Fascists and communists. Seven million Russian citizens have again, as they did two years ago, staked all on Vladimir Volfovich, a buffoon and windbag, a psychopath who declared a couple of days before the elections: "I have a solution to the Chechen problem—bombard the villages with napalm." Seven million Russians identify with Zhirinovskiy in his most innate chauvinism.

Another 14 million citizens of the Russian Federation have overlooked the indisputable fact that the communist party for which they voted annihilated tens of millions of people in their country, destroyed the nation's genetic stock, and nearly took the world to hell. The tragic Weimar parallel: The collective conscience in Russia is as lumpen as it was in the pre-Hitler Germany, which was tossed about in a ruthless clash between racial national socialism and communist international socialism.

Another bitter paradox: The Russians have voted for the very movements that have brought the greatest suffering to the Russian people in this century.

Presidential elections will be held in the Russian Federation next year. The president, as the institution that holds all of the main reins of state, will very quickly become the key to Russia's future. All the more so because he will be elected by the same voters that elected the new Duma the day before yesterday. Only a strong and truly democratic president will halt the advance of the red-browns. Otherwise, the final parallel will commence, that of 30 January 1933—the end of democracy and the fall of Field Marshall von Hindenburg.

Czech-Bulgarian Free Trade Zone Agreement Signed

LD1512134895 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 15 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiril Petrov Tsochev, Bulgarian deputy prime minister, and Vladimir Dlouhy, Czech trade and industry minister, signed an agreement on a free trade zone between the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in Prague today. The zone should improve bilateral trade and economic relations. Until 1990, Bulgaria ranked seventh or eighth in the then Czechoslovak foreign trade but it is only ranking 35th at present. Minister Dlouhy commented on the signing of the agreement with these words:

[Begin Dlouhy recording] We hope that the signed agreement will open up a much larger scope for bilateral relations. We assume that both Czech exports to Bulgaria and Bulgarian exports to our country will increase considerably. Of course, the agreement is of the standard type—that is, the whole range of commodities is divided into individual groups of commodities. The trade liberalization will be gradual, but it will be fast enough and will roughly correspond to the standard adopted by the CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association] countries.

Huska on Ratification of Treaty With Hungary

AU1912131395 Bratislava SME in Slovak 18 Oct 95 p 1

[Report by "(bog, jo)": "HZDS: The NR SR May Also Ratify the Slovak- Hungarian Treaty at Its Next Session"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"We do not want to interrupt or halt the ratification process under any circumstances. In the extreme event, if no satisfactory solution were found, the process could continue at the next National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] session," said A.M. Huska yesterday during a meeting of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Republican Board. He added that the HZDS is making no secret of the disputes within the ruling coalition on the issue of the treaty's ratification or even of the disputes that, according to him, have emerged following some of the statements made by the Hungarian Government on the treaty's interpretation. Nevertheless, he expressed the opinion that the treaty will be ratified in parliament, whereby "our vision of the basic treaty will be characterized." "We are working on minimizing disharmony within the coalition," said the HZDS deputy chairman in this context. In reply to a question on whether the HZDS is thinking about a new coalition partner for the government, A.M. Huska said that a joint commitment to the voters after the elections and an agreement on the government's policy statement bind the coalition together. "We are not considering any alternatives," he added. A.M. Huska did admit that the HZDS is thinking about moving its headquarters to a new building in Bratislava. He said that a building that VSZ [East Slovak Iron Works] Kosice is constructing in Bratislava is—as the media has reported—also among the proposals. It is a four-story building with 120 rooms, exclusive suites, and a fitness center. Its cost is estimated at 50-60 million korunas and VSZ should, apparently, hand it over to the HZDS next May.

Kovacs on Treaty Postponement

LD2212140595 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs is the first Hungarian politician who responds, in an exclusive interview with Slovak Radio, to the postponement of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty by the Slovak parliament. Our Budapest correspondent Gregor Martin Papucsek interviewed the Hungarian foreign minister:

[Papucsek] The Hungarian side would have been pleased if the Slovak parliament had approved, ratified, and confirmed the basic treaty. The document was signed in March. The Hungarian National Assembly had ratified it as early as before the summer, and leading Slovak officials promised that the National Council of Slovakia would do the same. This is what the Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, told Slovak Radio last night:

[Begin Kovacs recording in Hungarian fading into superimposed Slovak translation] To start with, a summer date was mentioned. Later, they talked about early autumn, then about late autumn and, finally about December. I feel, however, that it is better to slightly postpone ratification, rather than not ratify the basic treaty at all. [end recording]

[Papucsek] Regarding the Slovak plan to adopt an additional document to the basic treaty, Laszlo Kovacs said:

[Begin Kovacs recording] It is neither usual to (?modify) signed international treaties not is it usual to ratify them if they are unilaterally interpreted In general; parliament can either pass the treaty in the form in which it was signed, or turn it down. The proposal that our countries launch talks about interpretation [of the Council of Europe recommendation that ethnic minorities be granted the right to autonomous bodies] would mean that, in effect, we would start negotiating the treaty anew. Naturally, from the viewpoint of international evaluation of Slovakia and Hungary, this would not be beneficial. Moreover, starting negotiations anew would not enhance our credibility. [end recording]

[Papucsek] And if the National Council unilaterally adopts the document before the interpretation [of the Council of Europe recommendation is clarified]:

[Begin Kovacs recording fading into report] The Slovak parliament can do this, of course, but it would mean no action on the part of the Hungarian parliament and would change nothing in the text of the basic treaty, Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs said in conclusion.

Meciar's Comments Viewed

AU2212141295 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 21 Dec 95 p 4

[Commentary by Marian Lesko: "First Shelved, Now Postponed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Tuesday night [19 December], the Slovak prime minister explained to two editors, one moderator, and all the television viewers what he had actually signed in Paris in March 1995—a treaty that is in perfect order. On the points that really matter, the Hungarians had made concessions to us—Trianon

[1920 treaty setting the borders of successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire] is definitive, as is the Slovak-Hungarian border. The past has been closed. The Slovak side, and the prime minister personally, made only one concession—to allow the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly's Resolution 1201 to become part of the interstate treaty. Vladimir Meciar then listed seven guarantees that will not permit the recommendation to be interpreted as the Slovak side's agreement to collective rights for minorities and their possible demands for autonomy. The prime minister also spoke before the television cameras about how he had explained to representatives of the Slovak National Party [SNS] that they should not damage with their statements their coalition partner, that is, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], and that they "should not announce to the public facts that are not part of the treaty's contents." According to Vladimir Meciar, the HZDS, unlike others, "proceeds in its policy from consistent protection of national interests, but understands them in a broader than nationalist sense."

In other words, the prime minister said that he had signed a good treaty, whose interpretation is unequivocal, and it should therefore be ratified.... If this really is so, it is mysterious and incomprehensible why he explained all of this to the editors and the public, but not to his colleagues who should ratify it, the coalition deputies and HZDS deputies in particular. The day before yesterday, Meciar also announced that government deputies are working on a "document that would help unify and arrive at a common interpretation" of the treaty. However, according to the interpretation that he had put forward, this treaty does not need any interpretation! It is extremely strange for the prime minister and HZDS chairman publicly to admit that, in the nine months that have elapsed since March 1995, he has not found time to explain to his own club of deputies the political and legal contents of this good and important treaty that he had signed. He did not find this time even yesterday when this treaty was being debated by Parliament. Foreign diplomats [for whom Meciar hosted a Christmas reception on 20 December] were given priority....

And, while, admittedly, Minister Schenk recalled on behalf of the cabinet how important it was for the deputies to give their approval of the interstate treaty agreed by the government and signed by the prime minister, the government coalition deputies were arguing why there was no need to hurry this issue. The views expressed by Messrs. Hornacek and Hofbauer, and Mrs. Lazarova [HZDS deputies], not only on the treaty's contents, but on its entire raison d'etre, demonstrated that the HZDS club of deputies needs a meeting with the prime minister, as the treaty's main architect, more than urgently. Yesterday's postponement of the already intolerably long-shelved treaty indicates that its ratification is being mysteriously linked to the drafting of a law on the territorial and administrative division of the republic and, perhaps, also to the law on the protection of the republic. Is the shape of these laws to become the argument that will finally convince the coalition deputies to vote for the Slovak-Hungarian treaty? If this is so, its ratification really depends on everything conceivable except the treaty itself.

Parties' Views Outlined

AU1912145695 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 Dec 95 p 2

[TASR report: "The Majority of Parliamentary Clubs Are Procrastinating With Their Stances on the Treaty's Ratification"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] Deputies' Club will support the ratification of the Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic. In view of the precisely fixed date for debating it in parliament, there is still plenty of time for discussion. Each deputy has the right to decide independently on his course of action, said Tibor Cabaj, the chairman of the HZDS-Farmers' Party of Slovakia Deputies' Club, in connection with Wednesday's [20 December] ratification of the treaty.

The SNS [Slovak National Party] Deputies' Club has not altered its view, because its members are convinced that the treaty will not fulfill its task. Instead of providing a basis for understanding, it does not preclude the possibility that it will be the source of further misunderstandings, said club member Jozef Prokes. He said that the SNS deputies are not refusing to conclude the treaty with Hungary, but they are concerned that this document will not deliver what they expect from it.

The point of view of the Association of Workers of Slovakia Deputies' Club will probably be known just prior to the vote, as its members are still considering their course of action, Club Chairman Jan Borovsky revealed. He envisages that, following the conclusion of the debate, the vote will be postponed until one of the next sessions and that parliament will ask the Council of Europe for a precise interpretation of Recommendation No. 1201.

The members of the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] Deputies' Club are analyzing this document down to the last detail; they see its positive as well as its negative aspects. They will issue their final point of view on Wednesday during the debate, said KDH Deputy Jan Figel. He thinks it would be appropriate if Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar were also to make a statement to the deputies on the treaty. "He is its main architect, he signed it, and—in a certain way—he also surprised his own deputies' club by doing so," he said.

Milan Knazko assesses positively the very fact that the treaty was signed, but the lack of coordination between Hungary and Romania over a similar treaty and a certain risk taking in international issues face Democratic Union of Slovakia deputies with a complicated dilemma—"to behave badly or even worse." He is unable to state at the moment what its definitive decision will be. According to him, the risk consists of "whether we should have a signed treaty and of what it guarantees us or whether we are to sign a treaty that we cannot comply with," because no political party in Slovakia wants to implement collective rights.

There is no uniform opinion on the ratification of the treaty in the ranks of the Hungarian Coalition Deputies' Club. This statement was made by the club's deputy chairman, Arpad Duka-Zolyomi. He expects that all of the Hungarian Coalition's deputies will accede unanimously to this document. The reasons for postponing its ratification are—according to him—the lack of unity within the coalition as well as the approval of documents such as the law on the state language. He also considers the treaty to be necessary because it is an important step on the path of the Slovak Republic's integration into Europe. "We will not vote against the treaty, but the decision we make will be known just before this act," said Bela Bugar, the deputy chairman of the Hungarian Coalition Deputies' Club. According to him, the club's deputies have no problems making decisions.

Draft Law on Minority Languages Outlined

AU1912092895 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 16 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by Ivan Samel: "The Hungarian Coalition Has Prepared a Draft Law on Minority Languages"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Hungarian political parties active in Slovakia completed on Thursday [14 December] their draft law on the use of minority languages. The formulation of such a law is envisaged by the constitution and the government has also declared its intention to draft a norm. As Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] Chairman Bela Bugar has told NARODNA OBRODA, the basic differences—compared with the situation that applied prior to the adoption of the law on the state language—consist of the reduction in the minimum level for the use of a minority language from 20 to 10 percent of minority members out of the overall number of inhabitants and of the determination of three different categories according to the number of citizens belonging to the minorities. According to him, the draft not only concerns the Hungarian population, but all of the minorities and deals with the use of minority languages at the community and regional levels. The draft, according to him, has to respond to the law on the state language, "because it is impossible to accept it without—so to speak—ensuring that some parts of this law are revised."

They will consult the opposition parties on the draft and the final version will be known after it is ascertained what is acceptable to them. The consultations should be held as early as next week. In reply to a question on whether there will also be similar discussions with the coalition entities, B. Bugar said that they will consult them, while it is anticipated that informative meetings at least will be held. "In view of the atmosphere that developed during the debate on the language law, I do not envisage that there would be an agreement," added B. Bugar.

In connection with submitting the draft to parliament, he said that this depends on the parliamentary chairman, while he expects that he [Parliament Chairman Gasparovic] will adhere strictly to the 30-day period laid down by the law for every tier of the legislative process, despite the fact that these periods were often not adhered to in the case of the government's draft laws.

Planned Press Law 'Fettering' Mass Media

AU2712165095 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 20 Dec 95 p 3

[Commentary by Jan Fule: "What Is at Stake in the 'War of Journalists'?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Delegations of the Association of Publishers, Association of Slovak Journalists [ZSN], and the Syndicate of Slovak Journalists [SSN] met in Deputy Prime Minister Katarina Tothova's office on 3 October. We spent more than five hours going over the 11th version of the so-called press law, article by article. We agreed that, in spite of almost five years of common efforts, the latest draft was not perfect and the Ministry of Culture was to revise it. It was agreed, furthermore, that the draft would not be submitted to the government's Mass Media Council and that we would meet again.... At the same time, the deputy prime minister asked us not to publicize [nemedializovat] the drafting of the law for the time being. She received this promise, which no one has violated to this day.

The problem is that the draft has been submitted to the government's Mass Media Council, without the most important comments from the aforesaid meeting having been incorporated into it. The Mass Media Council sent it back to the Ministry of Culture, which, once again, did not rack its brains over proposals for changes.... The 12th, or I do not know which, version of the law is worse than the one that had been so sharply criticized by the participants in the October meeting, by the government's Mass Media Council, and, in some points, even by the deputy prime minister herself. Her comments were either insincere, or she lacks the strength and the authority in the government to assert her views in confrontation with the minister of culture.

Now as the year is drawing to an end, it is becoming more than probable that the artificially provoked conflicts between the SSN and "journalists who support national orientation and our statehood," just as the "vow of silence," were designed to create a smokescreen for the drafting of the mass media law, a law that should establish conditions for journalists' work, rather than complicate or even thwart it by means of anti-constitutional and "elastic" provisions.

In spite of the fact that, according to Article 26, section 2, of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic "the issuing of press is not subject to licensing procedure," the draft of the mass media law would authorize the minister of culture to refuse to register a periodical "if a well-founded suspicion arises that the Constitution of the Slovak Republic or the rights of other persons could be violated by the issuing of the periodical." What a well-founded suspicion can there be in the case of a periodical that has not even come out? This is not registration, but a licensing procedure, one, moreover, based on a very dubious criterion.

The second problem of the draft are fines for publishers. These would not be determined by a court, but by the Ministry of Culture. The amount of the fines — up to 2 million korunas — is clearly liquidiationist [likvidacna]. It is peculiar that the authors of the law follow the example of the pre-1918 Hungarian press legislation.

The third range of problems concerns the lumping together of professional, ethical, and legal issues. How is one to secure in periodicals the "consistent separation of news and commentaries"? There are many ways of getting around this.... However, the law will not solve this problem, which is why, in other countries, they do not even attempt to solve it in this way. Similarly problematic is Article 8, which, though it had not been consulted with anyone, has found its way into the draft. This "elastic article" reads: "Legal entities affected by this law act in conformity with good manners and the rules of decency and civic coexistence."

All of this, in combination with the law on the protection of the republic currently in preparation, will help to show, at long last, what kind of intentions can be hidden in our country behind the "struggle" for press freedom. The Club for Slovakia's True Image is active again. Only naive people could think that the prime minister was founding a second journalists organization for taxpayers' money out of sheer spleen.... What is even more startling is the fact that many fellow journalists who had not been permitted to exercise their profession for more than 20 years, on the basis of similar "norms," are now taking part, in their own characteristic way, in fettering the mass media.

Article Claims RFE Violates Contract

AU2012180495 Bratislava SLOVENSKE NARODNI NOVINY in Slovak 5 Dec 95 p 3]

[Article by Roman Hofbauer: "The Mouse That Will Not Squeak"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It was no accident that, in an article entitled "Seditious Licenses" published in the SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA WEEKEND supplement on page 16 on 28 July 1995, I reflected on the situation, operation, orientation, and goals of Radio Free Europe (RFE). Namely, the license of this radio station, awarded by the former Federal Ministry of Communications, expires by law on 31 December 1995 and, according to the laws in effect, the station—together with other interested parties—applied for a new license. In the Slovak Republic, the independent, extragovernmental Slovak Republic Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, located at No. 12 SNP Sq., 811 06 Bratislava, decides on awarding licenses. The Council members are elected by a plenary session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic.

In the "Seditious Licenses" article, I pointed out that the RFE was established under the Stalinist dictatorship in the 1950s as a U.S. Government station, financed by the U.S. Congress. Its broadcast certainly played a tremendously beneficial role for the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Its continued operation following the collapse of the communist empire in 1989, however, began to be ever more questionable as the ideological adversary, against whom it was oriented, ceased to exist. The U.S. Congress reflected on this situation, and this lead to a reduction of the broadcast for individual states, a radical two-thirds cut in the budget for its operation, and, finally, to the transfer of the RFE center from Munich to Prague, where it received the former Federal

Assembly building as its operational facility for the sum of 1 koruna!

From the very beginning, RFE was built as a tool of ideological power; its staff were mostly Czechs. While the collapse of the communist bloc was organized by the powers, the demise of the dysfunctional Czechoslovak federation and the emergence of independent Slovakia went beyond the framework of the scenario prepared by the powers. Therefore, after Slovakia became independent, all the RFE cannons and howitzers turned against the political scene that struggled, fought, and pushed to finally attain the sovereignty and statehood of Slovakia and continues to sustain its successful progress.

The exceptionally flagrant lack of objectivity and tendentiousness of this RFE "Slovak" broadcast in its relation to the legitimate political scene has reached such a degree that the number of its listeners in Slovakia dropped to an unbelievable 1.5 percent. The station also does a tremendous disservice to the United States because the Slovaks identify its operation with the United States' stand on Slovakia, and so the station actually absurdly cultivates in our citizens disgust with and disapproval of the country in which no less than 5 million U.S. citizens of Slovak origin live.

In the article I expressed my belief that the operation of a station with such an orientation, which is a historical vestige of the Cold War, does not benefit either of the two parties, except for its editorial staff and the broad circle of its external associates, who are fighting to keep their considerable wages paid by the U.S. Congress. At the same time, however, I also expressed my doubts about the possibility that the license would not be granted because Washington is not only the seat of the U.S. Congress, but also of the IMF and the World Bank; doubts that I illustrated with the example that there is no known case of a mouse that roared....

As expected, the Slovak mouse did not roar, and RFE received the license it wanted to hurl lies and hatred against the legitimate Slovak social and political scene from Slovak transmitters located on Slovak territory and on frequency bands assigned in Geneva to the Slovak Republic. I cannot describe this in any other way but as political, national, and social masochism! At the same time, the Slovak Republic Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting is not subordinate to the government, the parliament cannot influence its decisions, and its decision to award the license really was so independent that it even seems independent of the actual state of affairs. Let us now look at the text of the license, and particularly at the conditions under which the RFE can operate in Slovakia.

The following is the full text of the license:

File No. R/42/RUL/95 Bratislava, 12 September 1995

The Slovak Republic Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, as the pertinent entity according to Article 10, Section 3, Law 468/91 of the Code on Conducting Radio and Television Broadcast, inclusive of all changes and amendments implemented by Law 597/92 of the Code and Law 166/93 of the Code, assessed the radio-broadcast license application dated 14 June 1995 by the applying company:

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc.

1201 Connecticut Avenue SW

Washington, D.C. 20036 USA

represented by its executives: Kevin Klose (president), Tom Morgan (director); and having studied the documentation necessary to make a decision according to Article 32, Law 71/1967 of the Code on Administrative Procedures, issues the following decision:

According to Article 12, Law 468/91 of the Code on Conducting Radio and Television Broadcast as formulated in subsequent regulations (hereinafter only the Law), based on its resolution of 22 August 1995, the Slovak Republic Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting (hereinafter only SR Council for RTV) approves the application of the applicant and, according to Article 10, Section 3 of Law, grants:

LICENSE No. R/42 for radio broadcast as stipulated in Article 12, Section 3 of Law, an inseparable part of the decision are conditions determined by the SR Council for RTV.

In addition to the legal obligations defined in Articles 4 to 8 and Article 14, Section 1 of the Law, the operator of the station will ensure the satisfaction of the following conditions:

I. 1) Program Denotation: Slovak Broadcast of the Radio Free Europe

2) Expiry date of the license: 31 December 1996

3) Language of broadcast: Slovak

4) Broadcast territorial coverage: above regional

5) Awarded frequency: AM band—1287 kHz

6) Broadcast weekly time schedule:

239 minutes (Monday-Friday)

189 minutes (Saturday-Sunday)

7) Program characteristics: news and current affairs

8) Program structure: as per enclosure to license application

9) License holder must ensure that his broadcast observe the legislation of the Slovak Republic in effect and international obligations of the Slovak Republic. (Particularly: The Constitution of the Slovak Republic of 1 September 1992, Law 468/1991 of the Code on Conducting Radio and Television Broadcast as formulated in subsequent regulations, Law 110/1964 of the Code on Telecommunications as formulated in subsequent regulations and Law 81/1966 of the Code on Periodical Press and Other Media as formulated in subsequent regulations).

II. An inseparable part of this decision are the decisions by The Telecommunications Office of the Slovak Republic (frequency sheets) of 7 September 1995 that, according to the plan for utilizing the frequency spectrum of the Slovak Republic, assign the applicant the frequency 1287 kHz at these localities:

Velke Kostolany (File No. 7983/SKS-95)

Presov (File No. 7984/SKS-95)

Velky Slavkov (File No. 7985/SKS-95)

The license holder must satisfy all conditions linked to assigning the frequency.

III. 1) In the broadcast program, he will respect human dignity. He must not broadcast programs that could be interpreted as heckling or inciting violence. Information on tense situations must be balanced and matter of fact.

2) He will make certain that no discrimination whatsoever for reasons of race, national or social origin, religion, language, culture, sex, political or other opinions will ever appear in the broadcast.

3) He will guarantee the right to answer in the instance that false or misleading data is broadcast that compromises the integrity of a citizen or the good name of an organization or scientific or cultural institution or that deals with the work of a state entity. The citizen, organization, institution, or state entity can—within two months after the broadcast of the aforementioned data—ask in writing for a correction to be broadcast free of charge and propose its wording. The correction of the data must be broadcast at a broadcast time of value equal to that of the original broadcast. The license holder may refuse to broadcast the correction if he can prove the veracity of the data he is asked to correct or if the request was submitted after the aforementioned time period.

4) He will observe the program structure and time schedule of the broadcast in accordance with the license application.

5) He will make certain that repeat broadcasts do not exceed 50 percent of the total broadcast time within a one-month program structure.

6) In the broadcast program, he will guarantee a cultured standard of the spoken word by the moderators and announcers according to the rules of the Slovak literary language.

7) In the news and current affairs broadcast, the license holder will guarantee: —a clear differentiation between news reports and opinion, a comment, or a note, which must be ethical and honest; —respect for the right of the public to true and precise information on facts and events by ensuring the plurality, balance, veracity, objectivity, and impartiality of information. The truth of the information must be ensured by appropriate means of verification and control. The broadcast of current affairs must implement the principles of honest reporting, exchanges of opinions, and tolerance for different views; —a contribution by the broadcast to social stability through an alternative, firm, and impartial view of domestic affairs, support for a peaceful and democratic development through an emphasis on the values of democracy, a counterbalance to extreme views, and support for the integrity of the Slovak Republic and stability in the entire central and eastern European region; —the independence of the broadcast from any political party, political grouping, purpose-oriented group, or religious organization. The broadcast must not promote or advocate any sectarian, political, economic, or religious views. No media campaign is to be conducted in favor of a certain political line; —that correspondents will not express in the current affairs broadcast their own stands regarding facts and events or abuse their position to promote their own political and personal interests; —that the broadcast program maintains a peaceful, moderate tone, serves as an example of civilized, rational argumentation, and respects human rights; —that, if they are broadcast as part of the newscast, the full text of official communiques and statements by government and parliamentary entities are broadcast.

EXPLANATION

The SR Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, at its session on 22 August 1995, adopted a decision on awarding license No. R/42 for radio broadcast to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc. on the basis of the following: —the evaluation of the license application submitted by the applicant on 14 June 1995; —the submitted program structure; —the "Proposal for Entering a Foreign Legal Person Into the Business Register of the Slovak Republic" dated 15 June 1995; —the supplement to the application of 30 June 1995; —the supplement to the "Certificate of incorporation of RFE/RL, Inc." of 22 September 1994; —the analyses of the broadcast from November 1993, January 1994, May 1995, and July 1995; —the public hearing on 3 July 1995, where the applicant had the right to present his ideas and observations.

In judging the license applicant, the SR Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting took into account the fulfillment of the stipulations of Article 10, Law 468/1991 of the Code on Conducting Radio and Television Broadcast as formulated in subsequent regulations as the decisive criterion for awarding the license.

INSTRUCTION

This decision will take effect on the day when the SR Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting receives a written statement by the applicant that he accepts the license. This statement must not include any exceptions and must be delivered to the Council within 30 days after this decision is delivered to the applicant. Otherwise, the decision expires, and the license application is viewed as never having been submitted. The decision is final, and no appeal against it can be made.

This concludes the full text of the RFE broadcast license.

So, Part III of the text of the license gives rather extensive details of the conditions that the broadcast program must satisfy, but this part of the text seems to be farcical rather than serious. It is really impossible to take it seriously. Namely, the RFE does not have to worry about any sanctions whatever, for if the Council did not have the courage not to grant them the license, it certainly will not have the courage to point out to the RFE that it does not satisfy various license conditions. The possibility of resorting to sanctions, or even withdrawing the license, can simply be forgotten. Whoever would doubt it needs only to listen to the RFE "Slovak" program on any broadcast day, any program at anytime, and he will immediately know that absolutely all the conditions for the awarded license included in the Part III are violated every day, and the Council maintains a respectful silence.

So, the ladies and gentlemen, Lesna, Hluchanova, Cikl, Pechacek, Hrib, Zitny, Simecka, and all the other true-blue "Slovaks," as well as the exceptionally broad circle of external "Slovak" workers, whom the RFE supports in their hostile, anti-Slovak mudslinging, can be at peace not only for another year, but actually for any number of years. After all, the more they defame Slovakia, the better they will demonstrate to the financing U.S. Congress how the RFE is needed in Slovakia to protect freedom, democracy, plurality, independence, and especially their 30 pieces of silver, dependently independent of Slovakia.

There is no need to fear the Slovak mouse. It will not roar or even squeak, is it not so?! What, however, if the dissatisfied citizens presented their view on the matter directly to the main protagonists, the SR Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, No.12 SNP Sq., 811 06 Bratislava?! Or possibly to the U.S. Embassy to Slovakia, 4 Hviezdoslavovo Sq., Bratislava, since the ambassador has so frequently claimed a U.S. interest in Slovakia.

Coexistence Proposes New Administrative Counties

AU2212173195 Bratislava SME in Slovak 20 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by "rej": "Coexistence Wants To Have Territorial Entities in Which the Hungarian Minority Would Have a Majority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Hungarian Coalition insists that territorial entities should also be formed such that members of the Hungarian minority would represent the majority, Coexistence Deputy Chairman J. Kvarda said yesterday. He conceded that, in negotiations with the other opposition parties, the Hungarian parties may be ready to accept as a starting point the so-called counties variant, which does not mean, however, that they support it without reservations. Three of the 16 counties that they are proposing should, according to Kvarda, be formed in such a way that the Hungarian minority would be the majority in them. Kvarda admitted that it is difficult to find a partner for this view among the Slovak parties. He believes, however, that territorial and administrative division provides a suitable opportunity for solving the minority problem. Coexistence Deputy Chairman Arpad Duka-Zolyomi assumes that the process of ratifying the Slovak-Hungarian treaty will not be completed at the December meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. According to Kvarda, the government wants to use another postponement of the ratification to pass the law on territorial and administrative division, which should lessen resistance to the treaty within the coalition ranks.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 20 December on page 2 carries a 200-word CTK report on the Coexistence briefing. According to the report, Duka-Zolyomi announced that the three Hungarian parties were preparing to file charges against Slovak Television Director Jozef Darmo on suspicion of "spreading hatred among nations" and "fomenting anti-Hungarian sentiments." The reason is the documentary "Bloody Christmas," devoted to the "shooting of Slovaks by Horthyite gendarmes during World War II," which, according to Duka-Zolyomi, Slovak Television broadcast "repeatedly" on the eve of the debate on the ratification of the

Slovak-Hungarian treaty. The report also quotes Slovak Television Programming Director Milan Polak as saying that the showing of the documentary at this time was "coincidental and not deliberate."]

Kovac Alleges SIS Role in Son's Kidnapping

AU2012161695 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 15 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by "r": "President of the Slovak Republic Writes to Ivan Lexa"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"The latest development of the situation (rude and unlawful attacks by a convicted criminal on television against my son [reference to two recent interviews with Peter Krylov, who is serving a jail sentence in Germany, on Slovak Television], but also against myself, further pieces of evidence that tracks proving the criminal act of my son's abduction abroad are being covered, and so forth) force me to react to your open letter of 20 October 1995 in the same form," states the president of the Slovak Republic in an open letter addressed to Slovak Information Service [SIS] Director Ivan Lexa.

"I am not surprised by the 'deep concern,' expressed in your letter, because, having familiarized myself with the tangible evidence, I have again realized its reasons. Your concern has evidently been caused by witnesses' testimonies and by tangible and documentary pieces of evidence that clearly demonstrate the participation of SIS members and the use of special SIS equipment in the assault on a Slovak citizen and his subsequent abduction abroad. The unequivocal testimony by former SIS officer Oskar F.; the meticulously documented activity of SIS member Milan L. at the Bratislava-Petrzalka border crossing [to Austria] on 31 August 1995; the evidence on the involvement of Jaroslav S., a high-ranking SIS functionary, in the realization of the above operation; tangible and other pieces of evidence, including bills, clarifying and proving the use of special [SIS-owned] equipment (Mercedes 208 D van); and subsequent purchases and operations aimed at removing the traces—this is only a brief, far from complete, enumeration of facts that made me express my fully justified opinion.

"Given this situation, it is not my trust in the evidence assembled so far that is 'at complete odds with the elementary principles of a legal and democratic state,' but your refusal to relieve specifically identified SIS members of their vow of silence and to allow the inspection of specifically designated installations, automobiles, and technical devices. Only in this way will it be possible to refute the serious suspicions and clear the SIS's name or, the opposite, to identify and track down specific culprits. Only a proper, thorough parliamentary inquiry, carried out by a body composed of representatives of all clubs of deputies, can help attain these objectives.

"I was not surprised that you did not even attempt to promise help in investigating my son's kidnapping and abduction abroad because such help would have to start with steps that you are afraid of taking. Despite knowing you, I was surprised, however, and am deeply concerned, by the SIS' interest, expressed in your letter, in throwing light on the suspicion that the Bavarian Prosecutor's Office holds against my son. After all, neither the investigation of the damage incurred by Technopol [Bratislava company that was deprived of $2.3 million as a result of a fraudulent financial operation allegedly involving Michal Kovac's son], nor anyone's participation or complicity in this crime, and not even the evaluation of the investigation's results are part of the SIS's tasks assigned to it by law. Therefore, after your confirmation that information is being collected [by the SIS] about the activity of the president of the republic and about his family and working environment, the SIS's interest in the Technopol case serves as another proof of your unlawful activity," Slovak President Michal Kovac writes in conclusion of his letter.

'Civic Democratic and Liberal Party' Organized

AU2012124295 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 18 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by TASR: "They Want To Promote the Dominance of Civic Principles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosice—National tolerance and dialogue with all the political parties and movements are among the aims of the Civic Democratic and Liberal Party of Slovakia [Obcianska Demokraticka and Liberalna Strana Slovenska] (ODLS), whose preparatory committee met in Kosice on Saturday [16 December]. Jozef Hlavac, representative of the initiative group of former members of the Alliance of Democrats of the Slovak Republic [ADSR] and the Democratic Union of Slovakia [DU], announced that this year the ODLS should be opening two new offices in Bratislava and the east Slovak capital [Kosice]. The opening of offices in other Slovak regions is being prepared. The party, whose aim is to promote the dominance of civic principles, is open to all citizens of Slovakia. It will focus on liberalism, democracy, and the civic principle, which, according to Jozef Hlavac, the ADSR and its successor, the DU, failed to realize.

State Debt Increases 'Almost Fourfold' Since 1990

AU2712130595 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 21 Dec 95 p 4

[Report by Gabor Ferencz: "The State Owes 5 Trillion Forints — Reducing the Burden Is Not the Main Point"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The central budget's gross debt has increased almost fourfold in five years: As opposed to the 1.3843 trillion forints [Ft] on record in 1990, the state now owes more than Ft5 trillion. This burden consists of three types of debt packages in accordance with the way they arose: It can be calculated by adding the budget's domestic interest-bearing debt, the foreign debt, and the interest-free debt owing to the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] arising from exchange rate differences. (This zero-interest debt compensates for the MNB's loss arising from the forint devaluations in the case of foreign currency loans taken on by the MNB for the state. If this did not exist, then the MNB would have to create reserves for this purpose by increasing its interest rates).

The internal structure of the debt has changed through the years. The proportion of the domestic interest-bearing debt has decreased, while its amount increased from the Ft827.7 billion in 1990 to Ft2.4333 trillion by 1995. The proportion of the two other types of debt has increased: In 1990, the budget's gross foreign debt was Ft37.4 billion and the interest-free burden amounted to Ft519.2 billion; by 1995, these figures increased to Ft417.4 billion and Ft2.154 trillion respectively. In accordance with the law on the central bank, the zero-interest stock is being converted to interest-bearing debt, thus Ft59 billion debt was changed last year and Ft72 billion this year.

According to the views of financial experts, reducing this burden with the additional privatization income is not only important for reducing the debt stock alone. (The Ft200 to Ft300 billion in extra money only amounts to 4 to 6 percent of the central budget's gross debt). They consider it a more important aspect that this way the extra amount will not generate additional purchasing power; therefore, it need not be sterilized, namely, its harmful effects need not be neutralized by, for example, raising the interest rate. This would be hard to avoid if the money was used for current budget expenditure.

Central Budget's Gross Debts and Expiring Debts

(at current prices, in billion forints)

Year	Gross Debt	Expiring Debt
1990	1,384.3	—
1991	1,850.0	49.9
1992	2,305.1	35.6
1993	3,147.4	60.5
1994	3,751.6	133.3
1995 (forecast)	5,004.7	171.7
1996 (forecast)	5,375.3	339.6

Smallholders Party Allegations on Bank System

96CH0012A Budapest DEMOKRATA in Hungarian 23 Nov 95 pp 40-41

[Article by AGA-Szasa: "More Than 20-Percent Interest Is Illegal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Due to a legislative gap that has carefully been concealed until now, the already wobbly Hungarian banking system might be shaken to its very foundation within a month or two. According to information revealed by the Independent Smallholders, loans made by the banks since 1 January 1994 at more than 20-percent annual interest are illegal. The government rejects these allegations and accuses the Smallholders of scaremongering.*

The alarming facts surfaced last week in connection with an amendatory bill before the National Assembly. In its reasons for introducing the bill, the government states: "The Civil Code has to be amended because for years the 20-percent ceiling on interest rates has not been in accord with the market rates of interest." In this the government is absolutely right. However, market rates of interest have probably evolved in vain if they are illegal even today.

But how could this have happened?

Section 232 of the Civil Code sets a 20-percent ceiling on the rates of interest that may be charged on transactions. In 1984, a decree of the Council of Ministers amended this provision to allow higher interest rates. But when the Banking Law was being amended nearly ten years later, the 1984 amendatory section was rescinded. Consequently, the original statutory provision is again in force. Thus the mistake was made still under the Boross government, and nobody noticed it up to now (How come?).

In any event, the results are unpredictable. The combined total of loans outstanding in the banks' portfolios may be estimated at several hundred billion forints [Ft], and the loans they made since 1 January 1994 amount to at least Ft100 billion. The market rates of interest at present are about 40 or 42 percent. Therefore it is very likely that, if the mentioned legislative gap does exist, most borrowers will turn to their attorneys, to take advantage of an unexpected windfall. It is conceivable that, on the loans they have made since the beginning of last year, the banks will be able to charge, entirely legally, only half as much interest as they had expected. According to the Smallholders' reasoning, however, restoration of the lawful situation also means that the banks will have to reimburse, even retroactively, the interest they had collected on the basis of the illegal statutory provision. And that might raise questions about the solvency of several financial institutions.

Naturally, the legislative gap could have an adverse effect also in the other direction, for it is logical that interest over 20 percent, promised the public on its savings and securities, is also illegal. The public has at present about Ft240 billion of savings invested in sundry bank deposits, bonds, securities and treasury bills. To avoid earning merely 20 percent interest on these savings once the scandal breaks out, the [Smallholders] raising this issue suggest, it is best to place the savings already now beyond the reach of the tricky banks. The Smallholders' apocalyptic picture of the future forecasts wicked banks refusing to pay depositors interest and even demanding the return of the excessive interest already paid; the blocking of accounts; millions of individuals embroiled in lawsuits; a practically moneyless world; and a minor wealth reform (for if the higher interest rates were declared illegal with retroactive force, earlier borrowers would be enriched at the expense of the depositors up to now). This would be a world in which ten million angry individuals were concerned solely with sharing one way or another in the advantages of repayment.

But the government quickly branded as empty scaremongering the problem the Smallholders had raised. As Tamas Rusznak, the chairman of the State Banking Inspectorate, said at the special press conference convened on this matter, the mentioned legislative gap actually does not exist. It is true that the pertinent section of the Civil Code sets a 20-percent ceiling on interest rates, but that applies only to transactions between private individuals. At the same time, there are even now a good many statutory regulations that permit interest rates exceeding the aforementioned ceiling.

For instance, the Central Bank Law and the Banking Law, which regulate respectively the activities of the central bank and of financial institutions, are such statutory regulations. The Central Bank Law clearly authorizes the central bank to set, within its own jurisdiction, the current levels of interest rates for banks and other financial institutions. Accordingly, the central bank continually publishes the current interest rates on the banks' reserve deposits, on their borrowing from the central bank, and on repurchase agreements. These interest rates in their turn are the basis on which the banks set the interest rates they charge their customers on personal loans. In line with the high rate of inflation, the interest rates charged by the banks are already now substantially higher than 20 percent. The central bank at present does not set a ceiling on the interest rates the banks may charge. Pursuant to the regulations now in force, the banks may charge market rates of interest.

On the basis of all this, the Civil Code and the Banking Law appear to be at least mutually conflicting. The legislative gap, however, is merely a seeming one. For Section 232, to which Torgyan and his associates refer, actually reads as follows: "The annual rate of interest—unless a statute creates an exception, or if the parties agree on a lower rate—is 20 percent." But the Central Bank Law is specifically the mentioned exception-creating statute.

To put an end to the confusing situation, nevertheless, the State Banking Inspectorate's chairman favors amending the Civil Code by having the Council of Ministers quickly issue a decree to that effect. This case, incidentally, is not unique. At the time of changing over to a market economy, tens of thousands of laws had to be amended within a short time, and therefore they do not dovetail everywhere.

When asked whether the provisions of the Civil Code should not take precedence over a central-bank directive, Rusznak said that there could not be a hierarchy of statutory regulations. If regulations are issued truly on the basis of authority delegated by statute, they have the same force as amendatory laws enacted by the National Assembly. Specifically such delegated authority ensures in many instances that laws are kept up to date. The Foreign Exchange Law, for example, also delegates authority to amend it. For numerous capital transactions the law requires a permit from the foreign-exchange authority. At the same time, the law authorizes the government to amend the regulations whenever the economic situation permits a relaxation of the restrictions. All this serves to speed up the forint's convertibility. Without such delegation of authority, before each step toward full convertibility it would be necessary to wait months until an already overburdened National Assembly were able to place an amendatory bill on its calendar.

Zoltan Bodnar, the central bank's vice president, is likewise unconcerned that the issue raised by Torgyan might result in a flood of lawsuits inundating the courts. Judgment in favor of plaintiffs suing to get their money back would be very unlikely. Responsible persons, Bodnar says, must not make statements encouraging the public to withdraw their deposits from the banks and to sue the financial institutions. A panic could have very serious consequences.

In fact, the situation is not so simple. The Central Bank Law's wording is not crystal clear. Its Section 14 states: "The Hungarian National Bank is authorized to set the interest rates that the banks employ, including...also the applicable maximum interest rate." Section 71 essentially reiterates this: "Within the limits of statutory regulation, the Hungarian National Bank may issue, in the form of central-bank directives, binding regulations for the legal entities...engaged in banking; thus it may set...certain interest rates whose application will be mandatory." But neither the Central Bank Law nor the Banking Law explains or reveals what is meant by the phrase "within the limits of statutory regulation"—whether it refers to the Civil Code, the Banking Law, other laws, or perhaps to the body of law in general. Thus a legislative gap does exist somewhere after all.

The prospects of a favorable judgment in a lawsuit are worsened by the fact that the Central Bank Law is not the only statute in conflict with the Civil Code's ominous provision. The Law Decree on Savings Deposits, the Government Securities Law, and six other laws all mention interest rates higher than 20 percent. Lawyers are of the opinion that all legislation constitutes an integral whole and the various laws cannot be arranged in hierarchic order—in other words, one law cannot take preference over another. Thus eight other statutes are in conflict with a single section of the Civil Code and this fact, the lawyers at the State Banking Inspectorate believe, makes the situation clear. But they concede that different interpretations are also possible. In other words, the chosen interpretation might depend on which judge is hearing the case.

At any rate, the Smallholders' behavior in conjunction with this issue does provide food for thought. Obviously, the party was not motivated by a desire to remedy the legislative gap when it made the conflict public. After all, it was not even the Smallholders who discovered the conflict. They simply called attention to the government bill that wanted to remedy a conflicting situation.

In this rubric we have already noted on several occasions that the politicians' sole objective is to gain power by any means. In the behavior of today's opposition in Hungary, regrettably, this also includes scaremongering by spreading false rumors capable of shaking banks to their very foundation, by making shambles of our credit system, by causing the collapse of banks and enterprises, and thereby driving the entire Hungarian economy into bankruptcy.

IFOR Troops Half Deployed

AU2712115295 Paris AFP in English
1122 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 27 (AFP) — More than half of the NATO-led peacekeeping force for Bosnia is now in the former Yugoslavia, just a week after the Alliance began the biggest operation in its history, NATO announced here Wednesday.

Despite bad weather and the huge task of coordinating 60,000 troops from 32 countries, 34,590 soldiers had now been deployed in ex-Yugoslavia, spokesman Colonel Konrad Freytag said.

Of those, 27,967 were in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the rest in Croatia.

"More than 50 percent of what IFOR [Implementation Force] requires is already here.... It's not a bad result, on the contrary it is a good one," he added.

"We have some experience of doing winter operations."

The Implementation Force (IFOR) is designed to safeguard a peace accord on the former Yugoslavia reached in Dayton, Ohio, last month and formally signed in Paris on December 14.

Most of the IFOR soldiers in place are British and French who were already in the region as part of the UN mission which formally transferred authority to NATO commanders on December 20.

The United States is providing 20,000 troops, the bulk of whom will be based in Tuzla in northern Bosnia. Freytag said 1,400 of them had already arrived by air.

While 36 planes landed in Tuzla on Tuesday alone, engineers also battled to build a floating bridge over the Sava River separating Croatia from Bosnia to ensure more troops and heavy equipment could arrive from bases in Germany.

"We think we will cross (the river) before New Year's Eve," Freytag added.

Spanish Troops in Mostar

BR2712124895 Madrid EL MUNDO in Spanish
27 Dec 95 p 19

[Unattributed report: "The Spanish Hold a Meeting in Mostar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Spanish troops which will participate in the peace accord Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia held a meeting yesterday with military representatives from the three parties to the conflict in the south (Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs). The main goal of the meeting was to organize the deployment of peacekeeping troops in the area.

"The Spanish troops of NATO's IFOR force have organized a meeting with military representatives from the Bosnian Government Army (Muslim), the Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Serbs, the aim being to keep apart their forces in southern Bosnia," stated Commander Carlos Oveitas, spokesman of the Spanish IFOR battalion in Sarajevo.

Some 1,000 Spanish troops are quartered in Mostar and another 250 are expected to arrive from Split (Croatia) in a few days to provide logistical support to the battalion.

This joint meeting with the Bosnians began yesterday morning in Medjugorje, a village some 30 km south of Mostar, where the barracks of the Arågon Tactical Group in Herzegovina (southern Bosnia) are located. It was presided over by Colonel Julio Lopez Guarch, the commander of the Spanish battalion.

"One of the most difficult tasks awaiting us in the next few days will be clearing the mines that the three parties densely planted around Mostar," Commander Carlos Oveitas told the EFE press agency.

He also pointed out that within a few days the Spanish soldiers in Mostar will monitor the demarcation lines, after the Muslim, Croat, and Serb troops have left.

The Spanish troops have been quartered in Mostar since the autumn of 1992, when they formed part of the UN forces before being relieved this month by NATO's peace enforcement troops.

Oveitas said that 15 Spanish soldiers had died and several dozens had been wounded during the UN mission.

The Spanish troops, who are now monitoring the demilitarized zone in Mostar, prevent any troops or arms of the conflicting parties from entering the city.

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AFP Details Timetable for NATO-Led Forces

AU2212181495 Paris AFP in English
1717 GMT 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 22 (AFP) — The attempt to bring a lasting peace to the former Yugoslavia entails a long list of deadlines that need to be met by the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and the warring factions in Bosnia.

Here is the timetable, based on the Dayton, Ohio peace accords that were formally signed in Paris earlier this month:

— Wednesday, December 27: Deadline for Serb and Bosnian factions to withdraw from their positions along the ceasefire line in Sarajevo, ahead of the reunification of the capital.

— January 4: Lists of prisoners held by the factions must be in the hands of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

— January 13: Rival forces to have withdrawn to areas behind a four-kilometer (2.5 mile) demilitarized zone that will be policed by IFOR.

— January 20: All prisoners must be released; all factions must be disarmed and their civilian militia and other groups disbanded. Foreign troops and advisers involved in the conflict must be out of Bosnia, together with their weapons and other supplies.

On the same day as well, warring factions must be behind a line of separation one kilometer (half-mile) from Sarajevo. Forces in Gorazde must take down their equipment and pull out.

Moreover, a joint military commission must be informed about the positions of all forces within the 10 kilometers (six miles) between the ceasefire line and the frontier between the rival sides.

— February 4: Rival factions must be out of zones which were not designated as their territories in the Dayton peace accord. These zones shall remain free of all but IFOR forces, which will be able to enter them on January 20.

— March 21: IFOR is to withdraw from these zones and the factions can return.

— April 20: Heavy weapons from the rival factions must be put into storage. Troops that are not in barracks must be demobilized.

— Within six to nine months after the peace accord goes into effect, elections are to be held in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Prisoner Release Plan Detailed

LD2212203695 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1909 GMT 22 Dec 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 22 (TANJUG) — All persons taken prisoner during the civil war in Bosnia must be released by January 19, 1996, Francois Bellon, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegation for the former Yugoslavia, told TANJUG on Friday.

Under annex 1a, item nine, of the Bosnia peace accord initialled in Dayton and signed in Paris, which was also accepted by Yugoslavia and Croatia, the warring parties have pledged to submit to the ICRC the lists with the names of all persons that were held prisoner in connection with the civil war in Bosnia, within 21 days of the signing of the accord.

They have also pledged to release the captives 30 days after the U.N. Protection Force has transferred authority to the NATO-led Implementation Force (Ifor), Bellon said.

The parties — the Moslem-Croat and the Serb — must by January 4 submit lists with the names of the captives to the ICRC, to each other, to a joint military commission and high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina Carl Bildt, he said.

Once the ICRC submits its plan of action for the release of the captives to the parties, its delegates will hold a series of talks with the captives without any witnesses, at least 48 hours before their release, he said.

The plan is aimed at determining whether the captives want to be freed where they are or whether they want to be transferred to the other side.

In the next phase, the ICRC will oversee the release of the captives in the role of a neutral mediator, but chief responsibility lies with the parties that should manifest goodwill and do what they have pledged to do, he said.

On December 14, the ICRC sent a memorandum on guidelines to the Ifor commander, as well as to the Sarajevo Moslem government and the presidents of the Moslem-Croat federation, the Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb state), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia.

Bellon said Angelo Gnadiger, chief ICRC delegate for Western and Central Europe and the Balkans who had been instructed by ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga to visit Zagreb, Sarajevo, Pale and Belgrade, was already on his way to these destinations where he is to hold necessary consultations.

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AU2712115295 Paris AFP in English 1122 GMT 27 Dec 95

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General Dudakovic 'Optimistic' About Peace Accords

BR2612134295 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 25-26 Dec 95 p 8

[Interview with Bosnian Army General Atif Dudakovic by Ramon Lobo in Bihac; date not given: "We Will Not Allow Them To Catch Us Again by Surprise"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Lobo] Is it true that you are especially worried about Trjerdor, because that is your home town, or is it not?

[Dudakovic] No, I am not from Trjerdor, but from a nearby village, Bosanska Graviska, which is also in the Banja Luka area. But I do not want to focus on Trjerdor or Banja Luka, but on all of the occupied territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The time has come to implement the Dayton accords and, as a military official, I can only say that we will see to it that this is done. We hope so and we are optimistic.

[Lobo] Is it a good accord?

[Dudakovic] I cannot answer.

[Lobo] There are some intellectuals who say that what has happened here over the past few years is actually a continuation of the wars of 1914 and 1945... Do you think the 1992-95 war is over?

[Dudakovic] (long silence) Over the past few days the Serbs have opened fire against certain Sarajevo districts. They cannot accept the idea of losing them. It is obvious that the Serbs' appetite to control these areas will remain. This is an enforced solution. If there is no real determination to achieve peace or the implementation of peace, this may give rise to future conflicts.

[Lobo] NATO and the United States want to achieve in one year what the Austrians could not achieve in 40 years and the Turks in 400 years.

[Dudakovic] (smiling) It is not only the United States. It is clear that there are many countries with an interest in this area... It is an area where Western and Eastern interests intersect. It is difficult to find a formula for long-lasting peace in this area.

[Lobo] The Americans have openly expressed their interest to train, reorganize, and rearm the Armija [Bosnian army]. Maybe this year you will be given the opportunity to overcome the disadvantage with which you have been fighting?

[Dudakovic] You are telling the truth. However, we have to remain realistic and admit that the Serbs themselves do not possess modern weapons. What they do have is many weapons. If it was not for Yugoslavia's help to the Serbs, the war in Bosnia would have been over a long time ago. The price we had to pay for strengthening our army has been very high, we lost many soldiers. The current peace will certainly lead to reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovinan society and in its army. We must not allow them to catch us again by surprise. [passage omitted]

U.S. Army Ability To Implement Peace Questioned

AU2612184995 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 18 Dec 95 p 4

[Commentary by Sasa Rukavina: "Supermen in Fog"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the most frequent phrases used by the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Army fighters to boast about how well an operation went was to say that the Chetniks thought they were being attacked by the U.S. Marines or NATO. The aggressor's soldiers (for example, the infamous Ljubisa Savic Mauzer from Bijeljina) many times compared these fighters with Western soldiers. Watching preparations and listening to various U.S. stories about the deployment of IFOR [Implementation Force] in Bosnia-Herzegovina over the last couple of days, one feels endlessly grateful that it was only the ordinary Bosnians and Herzegovinians that fought in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

The U.S. 1st Division, whose soldiers are waiting to be transported to Bosnia-Herzegovina, cannot arrive due to the fog! Yesterday at about 1030, B-H PRESS reported from Tuzla that the Americans would try and land in Tuzla again. Reports have been coming in from Italy, where most of the U.S. forces are waiting for transport, that "weather conditions" have been delaying the deployment of IFOR. Bravo! This is a poor introduction for the supermen in camouflage that are supposed "to implement peace."

Even our communal services, which always used to be taken by surprise by snow in December, have learned what the weather is like in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fact that winter fog is something quite ordinary in this country must be known even to the Americans, who in 1984 delivered fog-dispersing equipment for the Sarajevo airport on the eve of the 14th Winter Olympic Games. The fact that roads in Bosnia-Herzegovina can freeze over, that it can be cold in December here, that the winter idyll consists of not only snow but sometimes fog, too, could baffle only a slow and awkward machinery such as an army.

It would be an exaggeration to mock all NATO planners. Look at the British, for example. They have been here a while, and were not to be taken by surprise by low temperatures. They kept their white paint warm, and had no problem decorating their camouflage land rovers with the IFOR markings. However, they must be the exception.

It is fortunate that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is not yet organized according to NATO standards. One U.S. officer admitted in a moment of sincerity that they lost the war in Vietnam the moment they became unable to chop a tree down without an electric saw.

What if they lose the peace in Bosnia because of the fog and snow?

NATO Commander Leighton Smith, Krajisnik Meet

Krajisnik 'Enigmatic' on Karadzic

AU2612190595 Paris AFP in English 1845 GMT 26 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Dec 26 (AFP) — Bosnian Serb hardliner Momcilo Krajisnik was enigmatic Tuesday about the future of his ally and indicted war criminal, Radovan Karadzic, the erstwhile unchallenged leader of Bosnia's Serbs.

In the first high level meeting between the Bosnian Serb civilian leadership and NATO's commander in Bosnia, Admiral Leighton Smith, Krajisnik said Karadzic was not present because it "was a courtesy visit."

As a member of NATO's Implementation Force, Smith has orders not to deal with Karadzic on account of his being an indicted war criminal. NATO has given instructions to its forces to detain any indicted war criminal if their paths cross in Bosnia.

Speculation over Karadzic's future has grown since the Dayton peace accord was signed earlier this month. Under the accord, Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb army commander, General Ratko Mladic, are barred from holding office in Republic Srpska, the rebel Serb entity which has become one of two political entities in a postwar Bosnia. The Moslem-Croat federation is the other.

Krajisnik, who has become a byword for stubbornness within the Bosnian Serb hierarchy, bitterly denounced the agreement as unjust since it was not backed by the "legal representatives" of the self- declared Bosnian Serb republic.

However, on Tuesday he admitted that though "Karadzic and Mladic are always present in the minds of the people", not everyone in the leadership would be around forever, "as they would like."

When asked directly by reporters about the future of the Bosnian Serb leader, Krajisnik said: "That question does not need an answer today. What position these people (Karadzic and Mladic) will have is a democratic question."

Delay in Serb Handover Considered

AU2612150195 Paris AFP in English 1454 GMT 26 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Dec 26 (AFP) — The commander of NATO forces in Bosnia, Admiral Leighton Smith, said Tuesday he would consider delaying Serb handover over parts of Sarajevo following a request from Bosnian Serb leaders.

Smith said he would seek the "wise guidance" of two of his senior commanders on the ground over the possiblity of extending a deadline after receiving the request at his first meeting with senior civilian figures in the Bosnian Serb leadership.

"I did not say yes or no. I am not in a position to negotiate the details (of the Dayton peace agreement) but I do have the authority to make extensions on time lines," Smith told reporters after meeting Momcilo Krajisnik, the leader of the Bosnian Serb assembly in Pale, just east of Sarajevo.

Under the Dayton accord Serb-held parts of the capital ultimately fully revert to government control 45 days after the transfer of authority to NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) Bosnian Serb forces must withdraw from these areas after another two months once government control is asserted.

Krajisnik, Smith Comment on Talks

LD2612210495 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1721 GMT 26 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 26 Dec (SRNA) — U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith, the IFOR [Implementation Force] commander for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, has taken on the obligation in Pale today of reaching a final decision on possibly delaying the implementation of the Dayton agreement in the Sarajevo area after consultations with his colleagues.

"I have taken on the obligation of closely monitoring the situation in Sarajevo and, after consultations with the commanders of IFOR land forces and troops in Sarajevo, Generals Walker and Rideau, of coming to a decision acceptable to all," Admiral Smith said at a news conference held after talks with Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Bosnian Serb Republic People's Assembly.

At today's meeting, the representatives of the Serb Republic put forward a proposal to Admiral Smith to delay the transfer of authority in the area of Serb Sarajevo for a year, in order to seek the best possible solution within the framework of the Dayton Agreement.

Admiral Smith said that he could make such a decision, but that he is not authorized to negotiate on changes to the Dayton Agreement, which the warring factions signed on 14 December in Paris.

Explaining the role of IFOR on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Admiral Smith stressed that they came "as friends to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement and to give the people who live there guarantees of security."

The American admiral said that he is "especially satisfied" with the cooperation so far of the leadership and people of the Serb Republic, stressing that the first results of the IFOR mission in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina are encouraging.

"Good things are happening. Everybody accepts us," Smith said.

Assessing the talks as constructive, speaker Krajisnik said that he promised the IFOR commander the active participation of the Serb Republic in the implementation of all aspects of the peace agreement, if the problem of the 110,000 inhabitants of Serb Sarajevo is solved in a satisfactory manner.

"Admiral Smith showed understanding, especially where the problem of Serb Sarajevo is concerned," Krajisnik said. "I hope that we will soon have a more clear situation and that we will remove the main obstacle to the implementation of the Dayton agreement," the speaker added.

According to Krajisnik, the leadership of the Serb Republic is not making the implementation of the agreement and cooperation with IFOR conditional upon a better solution for Serb Sarajevo, but is concerned that failing this the situation could get out of control.

People are afraid for their lives and property. Rhetoric is not enough, it is necessary to prevent the consequences," the speaker warned, recalling that the Sarajevo Serbs clearly stated their wishes at the recent referendum.

"Time is needed in order to reach the best possible solution. I am convinced that Admiral Smith will do it," speaker Krajisnik concluded.

Together with Krajisnik, in the delegation of the Serb Republic was Serb republic foreign minister Aleksa Buha.

Krajisnik Tipped To Succeed Close Ally Karadzic

AU2612153195 Paris AFP in English
1519 GMT 26 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec 26 (AFP) — Bosnian Serb hardliner Momcilo Krajisnik, a fierce opponent of the Dayton peace accords, is Radovan Karadzic's choice to succeed him as Bosnian Serb leader, say Bosnian Serb sources.

Krajisnik, who was Tuesday expected to host the first talks by civilian Serb leaders with Admiral Leighton Smith, supreme commander of the NATO-led Intervention Force (IFOR), has built a reputation as a close Karadzic ally.

Since the beginning of the Bosnian conflict the former militant in Tito's young communists, who converted to Serb nationalism in the 1980s, has become a byword for stubborness within the Bosnian Serb hierarchy.

The most senior Bosnian Serb representative at last November's Bosnian peace talks, Krajisnik bitterly denounced the agreement as unjust, saying Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had no right to impose an "unfair peace" on Bosnian Serbs.

He branded Milosevic's stamp of approval on the Dayton accords as "worthless" because it was not backed by the "legal representatives" of the self-declared Bosnian Serb republic.

The Belgrade press accused Krajisnik of sabotaging the peace process and risking "a new war against the entire world."

Milosevic retaliated by dumping Krajisnik and throwing his weight behind Nikola Koljevic, "vice-president" of the breakaway Serb republic, as the new Serb leader. Koljevic, a former Shakespeare professor at Sarajevo University, is viewed by Belgrade as a moderate willing to compromise.

Born in Zabrdje, a small village west of Sarajevo, 51-year-old Krajisnik studied economics at Sarajevo University, going on to spend 16 years in senior positions in the Sarajevo-based Energoinvest industrial complex.

Krajisnik spent 1986-87 in prison after being charged with siphoning off funds from a company of which he was financial director to build a weekend home for himself and Karadzic. However, both men were released and formal charges were never brought.

However the episode failed to damage his political career and in December 1990 Krajisnik was elected speaker of the parliament in Bosnia-Hercegovina, a position he retained until the conflict erupted in Bosnia early in 1992.

In April of that year, Serb deputies walked out of the Bosnia-Hercegovina parliament, setting up their own breakaway republic, whose parliament nominated Krajisnik as speaker.

Karadzic Dismisses Hague War Crimes Charges

AU2612170795 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Dec 95 p 3

[FONET report: "Serb Republic Independent in Union"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica — Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, said in an interview for Podgorica weekly ISTOK that he had not yet decided whether to run in the next elections, and rejected the war crimes charges against him. "I labor for my nation. I could have avoided the war crimes charges if I had betrayed my people. That would have made me a hero of the West, but that does not interest me," Karadzic said.

In the same interview he stressed that "the Serb Republic has more independence and statehood than Slovenia had before it seceded from the SFRY." Karadzic backed this claim with facts to the effect that — as he said — the Serb Republic had its own army, police, education, and information system, economic and political system, tax policy, and sport.

"We have our own assembly, government, and president. On the other hand the Muslim-Croat federation is yet to divide powers," Karadzic said, adding that "the Muslim ties with the Croats will prove catastrophic for them, as the Croats will be absolute masters in both the federation and the future confederation with Croatia."

"If we do not like it in the union, we will walk out of it," Karadzic said.

Air Force Commander Views Role During War, Future

AU2712125195 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 21-28 Dec 95 p 16

[Interview with Colonel Erdin Hrustic, commander of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina Air Force, by Sefko Hodzic; place and date not given: "Fighters in the Sky and on Land"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel Erdin Hrustic is the commander of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina Air Force. As a pilot of the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], he had approximately 1,500 hours flying time and, as a soldier and officer of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he had approximately 30 hours. Hrustic was born in Vitez in 1958. He graduated from the Flight School in Mostar and the Flight Academy in Zadar. As a pilot and officer of the former JNA, he served in Petrovac near Skopje, from where he fled in April 1992 and reported to the Territorial Defense of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Like most Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina pilots, he served during this war in the Air Force as well as other units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Although he has been a member of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina since the first days of its existence, he has the "bad luck" to be considered by some domestic and foreign correspondents as an officer who still serves in the JNA. Hrustic has good nerves, as is the case with most pilots, so he does not consider this very tragic. He sometimes calls news agencies who look for him "over there" to tell them where and since when he has been "here."

They "Stole" Aircraft

I found Col. Hrustic at Coralici airport near Cazin, where he was visiting the Bihac Air Force Group. He was accompanied by Brigadier General Nedzad Suljic, the commander of this Air Force Group, and some other officers. There was only one aircraft at the airport, a small camouflaged one, next to which we conducted this interview.

[Hodzic] Tell me something about the aircraft next to us.

[Hrustic] I cannot tell you very much about it. I only know that it is a piston-type aircraft and that it was "stolen" by a group of our pilots from Bihac before the war and hidden somewhere in the woods. It is here now. It was of much use during the war. And we shall be able to use it in future, too, as we have just brought it back from Zagreb, where it was repaired.

[Hodzic] Does the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina possess other aircraft?

[Hrustic] It does. These are the aircraft we seized from Chetniks or from the JNA just before or at the start of the aggression against our country. We hid them in meadows and woods. They remained there until it was safe to bring them to airports in the liberated territory....

[Hodzic] This is one of those airports. When was it built?

[Hrustic] During the first year of the war. It was built in a very short time by the Krajina population without any help. It enabled us to maintain the air bridge to Bihac during its blockade. This airport meant life for the Bihac area, that is for Una-Sana Canton, until August 1995.

[Hodzic] What kind of aircraft landed at this airport during the "air bridge."

[Hrustic] Aircraft and helicopters.

[Hodzic] Can one assess how risky the flights were? There are various versions of how many of our aircraft and helicopters were downed by Chetniks. Which one is correct?

[Hrustic] The one that says that one aircraft and one helicopter were downed. It was the helicopter in which Minister Irfan Ljubijankic and other members of the government delegation died. I would like to add that we have not received the official report yet about how that aircraft was downed. We assume that it was shot down, because an explosion was heard when it flew above Chetnik positions.

[Hodzic] What is the category of this airport? The runway is too broad, long....

[Hrustic] This is a C-category airport. It does not have a concrete runway, but it is capable of receiving aircraft of a certain weight.

[Hodzic] Have you ever landed at this airport?

[Hrustic] Not in an aircraft, only by helicopter, after the blockade of Bihac was lifted. I would like to add that one feels very nice, very happy when landing at one of our airports that is free and safe.

[Hodzic] How did the Air Force of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina come into existence?

[Hrustic] The establishment of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina Air Force began at the start of the aggression against Bosnia- Herzegovina. The first task was to find the personnel. They were gathered through the Air Force Groups in Mostar, Sarajevo, Bihac, and Civinice that were formed then. As our country grew stronger, we also got money, so that parts of our Air Force were put into operation. We have made considerable progress. We have the Air Force Command with its units, we have pilots, technicians, aircraft.... The tasks our Air Force performed during the war were really very important.

[Hodzic] What have you done that is not a military secret?

[Hrustic] For the time being, I can only mention humanitarian tasks: the transportation of the sick and wounded and saving their lives, the transportation of food and medicines to the enclaves, various economic tasks, the development of the infrastructure, the construction of relays etc.... I would not like to speak about other tasks; this is not the appropriate time. One thing is certain, however, the time will come when we shall be able to tell all. We have received numerous written and oral awards for everything we have done. We have been praised by the people, but we have also received awards from President Izetbegovic.

Brave Pilots

[Hodzic] What kind of aircraft do we have?

[Hrustic] The basis of our Air Force is helicopters, but we have planes, too.

[Hodzic] And pilots with a heart, since they flew to the enclaves across Chetnik positions....

[Hrustic] It is no secret that our pilots flew helicopters to the enclaves. That is, however, only one of the tasks they performed. It is not very well known that our pilots, and Air Force personnel in general, participated actively in clashes as members of the land forces. Pilots were commanders of reconnaissance and raid units as well as of brigades and operations groups. Some of them died performing these duties, some even died performing the duties of ordinary soldiers. A whole unit of the Bihac Air Force Group died during the last big battle here.

[Hodzic] They also died in the air.... Flying to Srebrenica, Gorazde, Bihac....

[Hrustic] Unfortunately, they did. These flights were extremely risky, and some of them tragic, all of our pilots and technicians were always ready to perform these dangerous tasks.

[Hodzic] The education of the first generation of our pilots has started. The peace agreement has been signed. If peace really comes and if we buy modern planes, do we really have the personnel, the pilots and technical personnel, who will be able to fly them, control them, and perform similar tasks?

[Hrustic] We have the pilots, and we shall have more of them. The technology of the Air Force is specific, however. Pilots must be trained for every type of aircraft that they have never flown before. There is also a big difference between the Eastern and Western flying techniques. In other words, the further education of the pilots will be necessary, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as abroad. We have the personnel, and we shall hopefully have modern aircraft, too. I believe that our pilots will soon fly new, modern aircraft; taking off and landing at our airports.

Commentary Sees State Profiting From Peace Accord

AU2512194995 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 15 Dec 95 p 1

[Commentary by Emil Habul: "The End of the War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Paris ceremony formally marked the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The masters of protocol arranged things to include a subtle symbol in the signing ceremony — it ended five minutes before noon. Another symbol was the U.S. president's smile and nod with which he accompanied the closing sentence in Alija Izetbegovic's address.

The speeches of the three presidents of the former Yugoslav republics differed in tone. Milosevic spoke about democracy and the democratic institutions that will be established after the elections. He gave the impression of a man who had nothing to do with the war, a member of the Helsinki Parliament from Iceland, which is ultimate cynicism. Tudjman, on the other hand, delivered a history lesson to all present, while Izetbegovic was concrete and his messages were clear: what the agreement means for Bosnia-Herzegovina, what the stance toward the Serbs is, and what Bosnia was expecting of the Implementation Force [IFOR].

The most important thing is that peace has come to Bosnia. In form and content this is an imposed peace. It was imposed by the international community following three and a half years of dithering, which thus demonstrated that it could have done the same in 1992. As it is an imposed peace, like all imposed things, it is flawed, and that is why it needs guarantors embodied by NATO and the superpowers. It has once more been confirmed that not a stone had been moved in Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout history without the superpowers' approval.

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not end like previous wars. That is why peace was not accompanied by the euphoria characteristic for liberated nations and peoples. The superpowers arranged things so that the war ended with a draw, and the issue of peace is treated as a contract between the protagonists of war, victims, and superpowers. However, this does not mean that peace will not establish the victors.

Like war, peace, too, will have its victims. Karadzic and his team will not survive peace. Replacements have already been carried out in the Croatian Democratic Community's ranks. As a rule, advocates of war lose out in peace. On the other hand, Bosnia's chances are much greater in peace than in war. Had the war gone on, victims would have multiplied, destruction continued, and there would have been the danger of the Bosnian idea dying out. Without the idea of Bosnia, there is no Bosnia. Peace will increase the chances of the promoters of the Bosnian idea. Moreover, it is not excluded that it will become the dominant political trend. Once ideas become dominant, then they have supporters who try to convince themselves and others that they have always thought this way. The older generation remembers, and books claim that in 1945 everyone was a partisan, or they at least pretended to be.

Bosnia should nevertheless exercise caution. There are opinions that the Dayton agreement provides both the option of reintegration and division of Bosnia. The most important thing is that the guns have fallen silent. Farewell to arms! Everything else is up to politics.

Serb Authorities Halt 'Mass Exodus' From Sarajevo

AU2612154495 Paris AFP in English 0121 GMT 26 Dec 95

[By Natasa Kuljic]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Grbavica, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Dec 26 (AFP) — Bosnian Serb authorities have stepped in to block a mass exodus from Serb districts of Sarajevo that under the Dayton peace accord are to be controlled by a Moslem-Croat federation.

Serb police have been ordered to prevent vehicles carrying household furniture from leaving Lukavica, a Serb quarter on the outskirts of Sarajevo, witnesses reported.

The directive was not publicly announced. But since December 14, when the Bosnian peace accord was signed in Paris, cars and trucks transporting family belongings have disappeared from the streets of the Serb stronghold in Pale, 20 kilometers (12 miles) south of Sarajevo.

Previously, dozens of Serb families from around Sarajevo, notably here in Grbavica, had been allowed to flee to Pale. Now they are unlikely to get any further than Lukavica. [passage omitted]

Since Friday French troops in the NATO-lead multinational force responsible for implementing the peace agreement have been on patrol in Grbavica.

On one street, they monitored Serb troops preparing to pull out of the district. Under terms of the accord, Serb forces have until January 20 to withdraw to positions two kilometers (1.25 miles) from a zone separating the warring parties. [passage omitted]

Pejanovic Wants U.S. Embassy in Serb Sarajevo

AU2612194895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirko Pejanovic [Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member and chairman of the Serb Civic Council] held talks today with U.S. Ambassador to our country John Menzies on the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and the role of the Serb Civic Council in its implementation.

Ambassador Menzies spoke of his visit to the parts of Sarajevo that are still under the control of the Pale regime. He had the impression that some positive processes were under way in those areas. The population does not want to leave those parts of the city. The people want solutions to be found in the spirit of the agreement and the establishment of peace, solutions that would guarantee human rights and equality.

Pejanovic suggested that the U.S. ambassador consider opening a U.S. Embassy office in the part of Sarajevo under Pale control. It was concluded during the talks that members of military formations that have committed crimes should be held accountable and charged for crimes perpetrated.

Pejanovic informed Ambassador Menzies about the demand of the Serb Civic Council that amnesty laws should be introduced for the Serb civilians on the territory around Sarajevo, and the initiative for the organization of a meeting of prominent citizens of Serb ethnic origin from the part of Sarajevo under the control of the legitimate bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Serbs from Grbavica, Ilidza, Ilijas, Vogosca, and Hadzici. As the team of international mediator Carl Bildt has still not started operating in Sarajevo, the help of the U.S. Embassy with these activities was requested.

Bosnian Serb Premier Meets Ukrainian Delegation

LD2312180495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1752 GMT 23 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Dec. 23 (TANJUG) — Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic and a Ukrainian delegation met in Banja Luka on Saturday to discuss economic cooperation.

Emphasizing the importance of historical ties between the Serb and Ukrainian peoples, Kasagic said that the coming period should be used for restoring these ties severed primarily because of the embargo against the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska.

'Now that peace has been established, we must revive our economy with the help of foreign capital, without which the reconstruction would be hardly possible,' he said.

Member of the Ukrainian parliament Taras Romanovich Kiyuk, who heads the delegation of the Chernovetsk region, said that Ukraine had lost billions of dollars because of the anti-Yugoslav sanctions and that it would do everything in its power to ensure their lifting.

Noting that foreign investors were not rushing to Ukraine and that the same would probably apply to the Republika Srpska, Kiyuk said it was therefore absolutely necessary to urgently restore economic ties where feasible at present.

'We want to do business with the Republika Srpska, and after seeing what you can offer we believe that everything should be prepared for the time when the sanctions are fully lifted,' he said.

Economic Cooperation Protocol Signed

AU2712121895 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 26 Dec 95

[Report by Mihajlo Orlovic — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] A protocol on cultural and economic cooperation between the Serb Republic and Ukraine was signed today. Moreover, the protocol provides for closer cooperation of the Bukovyna Oblast in Ukraine and the Banja Luka region.

[Orlovic] The four-day stay of the political delegation of the Republic of Ukraine, which visited firms in Prnjavor, [Bosanska] Gradiska, Celinac, and Banja Luka at the invitation of the Banja Luka Chamber of Commerce, ended today with the signing of the protocol on cooperation of economic organizations and universities.

The protocol on economic cooperation was signed by Svetislav Mudrenovic, vice president of the Serb Republic Chamber of Commerce, and (Taras Romanovych), head of Ukrainian delegation and parliamentary deputy. The document calls for cooperation between economic institutions, cooperative relations, joint investments, the development of trade relations, etc. Two expositions on economic achievements are scheduled to take place come springtime in Banja Luka and in Ukraine.

The second protocol on cooperation between the universities of Banja Luka and Chernivtsi was signed by Dean Dragoljub Mirjanovic and (Nikola Tkatch), vice president of Chernvitsi University.

The economies of the two countries will enable a successful economic cooperation, particularly in the domain of electronics, radio equipment, agricultural production, the furniture and shoe industries, and other branches. Our delegation was pleased to accept an invitation to visit the friendly country.

ICRC Insists on Continued Mostar Operations

AU1812145995 Paris AFP in English 1440 GMT 18 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec 18 (AFP) — Red Cross officials on Monday said they would continue to operate in the region following the signing of the landmark peace accord, easing local fears of a pullout.

"We want to reassure them that we are still here and that we are not going away," Remo Tamburlin, the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] delegation in Mostar, told a press conference.

He said many local residents had expressed concern in recent days that the ICRC would stop operating in the area following the signing of the peace accord in Paris last Thursday.

He said his agency was waiting for Croat and Bosnian authorities to present within 21 days of the signing ceremony the names of prisoners still held by either side as called for by the peace accord.

He added that by the end of January, the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians must have released all detainees they are holding in ex- Yugoslavia.

"The release of prisoners is the most important step for peace and everybody knows this," he said. "It will bring back some confidence in the people."

Tamburlin said ICRC workers in the Mostar region were still regularly visiting prison camps to check on the condition of those detained and to ensure their release.

He said he could not provide details about the location of the prison camps or the number of detainees because of confidentiality rules with local authorities.

"We can't say exactly how many prisoners there are but it's in the hundreds," he said.

He added that his agency would also continue gathering information on missing people and "protecting the civilian population to ensure that their basic rights are protected."

That includes providing aid to refugees in the region and medical assistance to those wounded during the war.

Mostar was placed under European Union administration in July of last year after 11 months of fierce fighting between the mainly Moslem Bosnian forces that control the east side of the city and Croat troops that control the west side.

Muslims, Croats Differ on Mostar Status

LD2312182195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1757 GMT 23 Dec 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 23 (TANJUG) — The administration set up by the European Union in Mostar said the Muslim and Croat sides' have totally opposed stands towards the Dayton agreement, which envisages this divided city be organized as a community with six municipalities, the Muslim-controlled Sarajevo Radio reported Saturday.

The Muslim side demands, the same source said, that Mostar (Herzegovina region) have the status of an ethnic community, while the Croats urge the formation of three Croat and three Muslim municipalities.

A meeting held at the administration headquarters in Mostar on Friday failed to produce any agreement on delimitation of new municipalities.

The European Union ambassador to Mostar warned the federal partners that unless they harmonize their stands soon, European Union administrator of Mostar Hans Koschnik would have the final say on all disputed issues.

The Muslims and Croats signed in March last year an agreement forming a federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, following a year of bitter fighting for domination over territories with mixed population in the central and southern parts of this former Yugoslav republic.

One of the sites of fiercest Muslim-Croat fighting was Mostar, from which Muslims and Croats ethnically cleansed more than 30,000 Serb residents.

Delic, Izetbegovic Address 3d Corps on Anniversary

AU1512212695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Dec 95

[Report by Sefik Mahtic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The ceremony marking the third anniversary of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's 3d Corps was held in Zenica today with an inspection and parade of all Corps units. Apart from being addressed by their commander, Brigadier General Sahib Mahmuljin, the participants were addressed by Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff, and Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who expressed great pride in these forces. Sefik Mahtic reports:

[Begin recording] [Mahmuljin] Dear soldiers, Salam Aleikum.

[Soldiers in unison] Aleikum Salam.

[Mahmuljin] Gentlemen soldiers, greetings to our homeland.

[Soldiers, in unison] Greetings to the homeland. [end recording]

[Mahtic] [Words indistinct] 3d Corps, which, for the first time after three years of brilliant victories, stands united in an impressive (?line before) their president and the General Staff with generals and the commanders from the neighboring Corps.

The Corps commander, Brigadier Gen. Sahib Mahmuljin, did not mention everything that the 3d Corps has gone through and has achieved, because everybody knows that. This is the result of our people's strength, and therefore he did not hide his pride.

[Begin Mahmuljin recording] Be proud to be a citizen of Bosnia, a Bosniak, a member of the Army and the 3d Corps. [Word indistinct] glad to have the honor of being a commander of the best fighters in the world. I am proud of that. I would like to thank you. Let Allah reward you for everything that you have done in this just battle and glorious victory of ours. We have done the impossible with God's help. We have gone through very difficult, infinitely difficult days together with our people. And as you can see, thank God, we have endured. This strength that we have is from the people.

On one occasion, our supreme commander told us: You should resemble your people. We could have not done anything else. The 3d Corps is, of course, [word indistinct] the people. We are obliged to remember everywhere, not only with words, but also with deeds, and with special respect our fellow fighters who have written the glorious history of our Corps with their own lives and bodies. Let beloved Allah give them the promised reward and they should be our witnesses that we are worthy their sacrifice.

We as people and an army must learn forever that we can survive only if we are worthy of our sacrifices and if we are together and united.

I call on you to be united, to, with God's help, rely on our own intelligence and embark toward further prosperity.

The area in which we live respects only the strong. We have proven this at Vlasic, at Vozuca, at Ozren, at Nagosic, and throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We are strong, but must become even stronger. In our future, we must always be prepared to defeat those who intend evil things to our people and our homeland. This is our task. We are for peace, but swear by mighty Allah that we will not be slaves. [end recording]

[Mahtic] At the beginning of his address the commander of our army's general staff, Army General Rasim Delic, congratulated the 3d Corps on behalf of all commanders, and paid tribute to the civilians who contributed to the building of the corps and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army on the whole. At the end of his speech he said a few words about what we are today and what lies ahead:

[Begin Delic recording] I congratulate you on today's anniversary, and wish all of us and all of you a great deal of good luck in the days ahead, which will still be difficult and full of uncertainty. But, looking at these units here and other units throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, I know and I promise, before the president, who is our supreme commander, and before the civilians, that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will carry out its task fully, whether we want to observe and wind up everything that was agreed in the Dayton agreement, or whether we need to be the guarantor of the survival of this people and this country today, tomorrow, and in the future. Good luck in peace to all of us. [end recording]

[Mahtic] Clearly moved by the magnificent atmosphere and the size of our defense force, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic first congratulated the 3d Corps fighters on their heroic struggle for freedom, and recalled his tours of front lines when everyone promised him: Do not worry, they will not pass. We owe them a great deal for everything they gave to their homeland, and we must not forget the children of dead soldiers and the invalids, President Izetbegovic said. He ended his speech by saying what we should do in the future:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] We will carry out our obligations toward our dead soldiers. We will carry out our obligations toward our invalids. We will educate our children, we will open factories, build houses, bring back our people, our refugees scattered around world. We will do everything to punish the criminals. We promise to do all this with God's help. We will unite our Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thank you. [end recording]

[Mahtic] The strength of the 3d Corps is also confirmed by the names that its units have acquired in the past three years: The 7th Muslim Liberation Brigade, the 303d Hill Brigade, the 372d Sooty Brigade, the 377th (?Posavina) Fierce Brigade, and the 327th Hill Brigade have all acquired the name of Chivalrous Brigades.

By the decision of the state presidency, the 314th, 374th, and the 373d Glorious Brigades will be joined by the 328th Brigade from the 35th Division of the Land Forces as of today.

The first part of the ceremony ended with these awards and announcements. The second part was the festive parade of all units of the 3d Corps.

The strength of central Bosnia paraded through Zenica Boulevard in front of our president and military leaders. President Izetbegovic had the following to say about it:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] For me, this is not a parade of personnel and equipment but a parade of courage and capability of our people. Why courage and capability? Because our soldiers captured from the enemy a good part of the equipment you will see. They acquired this equipment with their courage. The other part of the equipment we manufactured ourselves in our factories, owing to our know-how and our people's capability. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Troops of 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade Take Oath

AU2012182895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Dec 95

[Report by the 81st Division's Information Service from Gorazde]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] The members of the 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade today took the oath [words indistinct]. We have a report from the Information Service of the 81st Division in Gorazde.

[Unidentified correspondent] The [words indistinct] of the unit was attended by members of the 81st Division's command, representatives of political and religious communities in the region, and commanders of the remaining units comprising the division.

The troops and commanders of the 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade were congratulated by the brigade's commander, (?Captain) Hajrudin Dejcic, Rijad Raksic, chairman of the Gorazde Municipal Assembly, Municipal Governor Smajo Baktelija, Gorazde Mufti Hamed Efendija Efendic, and Brigadier Hamid (?Basto), commander of the 81st Division.

Brigadier (?Basto) said that the main reason which led the command to form this unit was the desire to increase our forces' comprehensive combat power, but also to secure for troops, believers, the necessary conditions for conducting their religious obligations, and to place them all in the same unit.

The decision to form the 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade was made in May of this year, but the summer's events on the fronts prevented it from being set up before August. Since then, the barracks have been prepared and the unit has been [words indistinct], so that today marks the finale of a very serious and responsible task. [passage omitted]

Commander of 9th Mujahidin Brigade Interviewed

96BA0040A Travnik BOSNJAK in Serbo-Croatian 28 Nov 95 pp 2-3

[Interview with Senahid Hadzic, commander of the 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade, by Rifet Haskovic; place and date not given: "Crucial Test"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Haskovic] What were the first steps, commander?

[Hadzic] It was the Bayram-namaz prayer, we knelt, and we climbed onto the ramparts of the fortress in Kula Grad. We looked in the direction of the Drina, in the direction of Bijeljina. They were murdering Bosnians in Bijeljina, dear God how could we get there, how could we help? And then they also struck Zvornik. The attack on Zvornik, an hour or two of slaughter, and the Christians set off to Kula Grad. Captain Almir was with us. We were very close associates, old Asim had told me about the prewar activities supervised by Capt. Almir, but I did not know who Capt. Almir was. The strike was carried out by the Novi Sad Corps, the tanks rushed in from Snagovo, the howitzers rained down shells from Zvornik and Divic.... We stood it as long as we could, there was nothing we could do, Kula fell. Soon Kalesija also fell. It was hell, what can I tell you? It was only at Kalesija that I learned Capt. Almir's real name: Samir Nistovic.

[Haskovic] Black Swan?

[Hadzic] On 28 April 1992, in Zaseok, I met Senad Mehdin Hodzic, Black Swan. That is, Ibro Huremovic, activist in the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and one of the initiators of the resistance and founders of the PL [expansion unknown] in the Kalesija District, told me even before Kalesija's fall that in the area of Zaseok, Sapna, and Nezuk there was one of our special units headed by Swan. Then we went from Kula Grad to Medjedja, from Medjedja to Nezuk. That was where I met Haset Tiric. Even today, I see before my eyes Haset's red beret, high forehead, and Senad Swan's warm smile. I was carrying an M-48 rifle, I had 20 rounds in my pocket, a bag of bandages on my shoulder. "Eh, you are our doctor," Senad told me, and he promised me a Heckler instead of an M-48.

[Haskovic] And Capt. Hajro?

[Hadzic] There was a fierce battle on Cilovo Brdo, several wounded fighters, and the Heckler he gave me "had to go to work." In Zaseok, I saw a handsome man, he laughed, and held tightly to the hand grenade hanging from his bulletproof vest. "That is Capt. Hajro," I was told by a wounded soldier. Hajro was later my commander, my friend, a hero who taught me much. At that time, I met Babak, Cama, Amir Nambijar....

[Haskovic] The doctor and the PAM [antiaircraft machine gun]?

[Hadzic] In mid-June, I returned to Sapna. The late Capt. Hajro was wounded. Semso Muminovic told me that there was no doctor in either Godusa or the Krizevac Company. "Take your pick, where do you want to go?" Semso offered me. I decided on the Krizevac Company. That is where I met the late Bajazit "Baja" Mehmedovic, and Baja introduced me to the M-84, the PAM, the PAT [antiaircraft cannon].... The fighter said I did great with the PAM. That is where I "earned" a high rank—PAM doctor. My first wound and then the second, a little break, the transfer. Nesad Sabic, at that time commander of the Zvornik OS [district staff headquarters], came and lectured me on how I should do my job, and he appointed me head of the medical team. That was a big problem for me: How to leave the Army, how to leave my fellow fighters and not bear the burden of shame? I often remember that, even today the commander's words frequently show me the way: "There is no compromise, there is an order, one thing that is more urgent than something else which is urgent!"

[Haskovic] Boskovici and more wounds?

[Hadzic] As head of the medical team, I dare not say this in front of the medical personnel, I learned in wartime how to bandage only my fellow fighters and myself. That was the case at Boskovici, where I was wounded the third time. I patched myself up and went on. After Semso formed the 206th Zvornik Brigade, they gave me the post of assistant chief of operations and training. Then came March '93 and the attack on Kovacevici. They came with tanks, and we did not even have a decent rifle grenade. The Drina Valley people are amazing. Like those from Krajina. Like it or not: the Krajina people are like the Drina people. I heard them ask Commander Muminovic whether we needed anything, what the situation was, would we hold out, etc.? "This is how it is," he said, "we are up against chetnik tanks and personnel carriers, send us cigarettes or a handful of tobacco!" Just imagine! I will never forget that. We stopped one tank, a second piled into the wreck and turned over. "Stick with the red arrows," I heard from the IKM [forward command post]. Lord, what were the red arrows? I had in mind some small tactical unit, what would that be compared to 25 tanks? Our people set out with their red arrows, the chetnik tanks moved down the chasm. We stopped 10 tanks, the rest ran away. We came upon a bus full of chetniks and a truck loaded with materiel. So the PAM doctor also encountered the red arrows.

Wounded Prosthesis

[Haskovic] Another "patch"?

[Hadzic] Problems with the Hawaiians, and they sent the 206th up to Vares. I took a round in the hip. Really, you patch it and move on. You had to, because right at that time the chetniks were attacking Teocak, "Seminar '93" was beginning. Zijad "Joja" Omeragic took a mortar and moved through the chetnik ranks as in a grand slalom. I called him the mobile BST [recoilless cannon]. There was no end to what the late Joja could do? Visoka Glavica was trembling, they were getting to us at elevation 505. Babak told Semso that he must order evacuation of civilians from Teocak. There are controversial stories about Semso, he is often praised, and just as often blamed. I recall the time of the "Seminar '93" chetnik offensive and the nerve of Semso Muminovic, who was a superb officer and expert. "No retreat, we are going to counterattack!" the commander said, and inquired about the situation in the field. Our counterattack began in the morning. The results are well-known when the Lions from Teocak and the fighters from Zvornik joined one another: They loaded the riddled chetniks on tractors, and the war criminal Mladic failed the so-called seminar. Visoka Glavica was taken back, along with the view of the Drina and once again a heart bursting at that view.

[Haskovic] Adil "Dajdza" Omerovic and the wounded prosthesis?

[Hadzic] Adil is one of the best fighters from Zvornik. He was wounded seven times. The Omerovic brothers are a story to themselves. Three of them received the Gold Lily, and two were permanently disabled. In one action, Redzo Omerovic lost a leg; as soon as the wound healed, he got an artificial limb and took up his gun. Before the action, we stole his artificial leg and hid it. To no avail! He found it and set out. In one assault, he was hit again, a PAM took away half of his artificial leg. He got a new one! That is the strength of Bosnia!

[Haskovic] Lisaca?

[Hadzic] At Lisaca, Adil, the brigade chief of staff, received his sixth wound. I was also hit. My bulletproof vest was torn, my helmet was riddled. Fortunately, only a small shell fragment. They hauled Adil and me off to the hospital, we left on the fourth day. Again, at Lisaca. You have to. The chetniks seemed to want to surrender, but they vacillated. I lost my head and went right out among the scum. The only weapon I had was a package of cigarettes and a lighter. "How is it going, lads? Are you cold?" I asked them, as though I cared. They were totally confused. I took from my pocket those cigarettes from the hospital and offered them around. They lit up. The whole pack. "Why not surrender?" I asked. "The Command won't let us," said a clean-shaven chetnik. Hajrudin "Karabeg" Karabegovic was with me, he laughed, looking at the clean-shaven "little hero." Karabeg is an exceptional fighter, his only fault is that he never had the luck to be wounded. The chetniks still had not come to themselves, and Karabeg asked about their wounded. He explained to them that I was a doctor and it would be good for me to examine them and bandage the wounded. We moved through the trenches to a hole in which the wounded chetniks were laid out. There was some kind of stove sputtering, it was smoky, the smoke made your eyes smart. They brought me some kind of a bag with bandages. I looked at them one after another, and I saw many had been wounded back when Lisaca was surrounded. Their bandages were stuck. "You know what, lads," I began to "brainwash" them, "if you spend another 24 hours in this smoke, because your wounds are infected, you will all die, and then surrender will not help." They did some whispering, and I saw that it might work. I used the walkie-talkie. Come in, Commander Semso! I told him to immediately send new bandages, medicine, stretchers.... "But, doctor, surely you are not among them, God help you," Semso scolded me. Their man did some negotiating with Sale and Semso, again they put certain conditions, they dragged it out. "Lads, everything is agreed about the surrender, so let us set out slowly," I tried to be convincing. "What will we do with our rifles?" one of them asked. "Leave your weapons in the trenches, that's the agreement," I said. They did what I said. Karabeg brought up the rear of the column of chetniks and laughed. Lisaca was clean. Sale Malkic was amazed, Semso Muminovic was amazed. Even I did not understand it. And lest I forget! Destiny is no joke! I took a chetnik, Andjelko Mikic from Belgrade, piggyback and carried him toward our line. He was wounded in the knee. Wounded the same time I was. He said he was hit by a glycerin shell. He was operating the PAM when it hit him. He was hit by a glycerin shell and I by a PAM [antiaircraft machine gun]?! He me, and I him! I carried him on my back, we talked, destiny is no joke. It is so written.

Bosnian Muslim "Special Teams"

[Haskovic] Elevation 166, Stolice?

[Hadzic] Gradacac and Elevation 146? We were good. The Stolice Relay Station and Operation Spring '95 was an action for the textbooks. No sooner had we taken Stolice, than the chetniks struck from the rear, perfidiously. They took from us Suha Cesma. "Doctor," Dajdza began, "shall we go back for materiel and take back what we have lost?" There was nowhere to go. We were joined by Dzemo, Murat ... all splendid lads. They started zig-zag fire through the chetnik ranks. The fight went back and forth, and, by God, we took back Cesma. We went back to elevation 902, Sale called with congratulations. He turned the mike over to the corps chief of staff, Sulejman Budakovic. "Doctor, do you know what your lads have done?" Uncle asked. I figured that we had messed up, I had no idea what was coming next. "Good doctor, you have surrounded the relay station." Uncle is on the other side. That was a load off my mind.

[Haskovic] Zecija Kosa and the big children?

[Hadzic] March '95. Elevation 702, Skikovi, Zecija Kosa... Our people from several directions, and the relay station was done for. It no longer existed. The chetnik is a strange animal, you can never figure how dirty he can be. They strike with tanks, they fire artillery. The land is on fire. Forty shells into one earth bunker?! They took Glavica. Our man from Krajina, Senad Kljajic, came with Karabeg and Popeye. He said we must take back the dominant elevation. But that meant letting the line go. That was the most difficult moment of my life. The IKM [advanced command post] of the 206th and a walkie-talkie in my hand. I asked what had happened to Zecija Kosa. "All over, man, everything fell, nothing left!" the company commander told me. I felt hot tears run down my cheek. How many friends I had lost, how much blood and sweat, how much..., and now there was nothing. I turned and looked for my people. Only Karabeg. "Shall we?" I asked through my tears, and I saw that Karabeg was also crying. "Yes," he said. We were joined by six lads from the 210th, only one from the 246th. Karabeg on the left, I on the right. Trench by trench. They started to flee. They struck Kalesijske Gazije from the flank. Great. To make a long story short. Quite a bit is known today about the chetnik Operation Hammer and Anvil. We know how their plans were broken and scattered. Just let me say a few words about the children from Godusa. Dajdza went from house to house gathering up the children. All of them 12, 15, 16. "Get rid of those sticks, here are real guns," Dajdza began his short training course. "We are going into action," he said, and the children were really interested. No joke, they had real guns, and Dajdza for a commanding officer! "Where are you going, you there Adil, where are you taking the children?" an old woman asked. "It's okay, let them learn, it's time," he told the old woman. We deployed the cadets' among the trenches and waited for Dajdza's instructions. The children laughed, they were not afraid of the chetniks. They were a little worried about what they would tell their mothers when they arrived home late. The chetniks were digging in, preparing for an attack. We attacked them and hit them again and again. The children fired the guns, and the recoil made them jump. For them this was like playing with toy guns. The chetniks were running from Celici to Teocak. They did not understand what had happened. The children went home happy because they had fired real guns, we were happy because we had repelled the chetnik attack. That is the strength of Bosnia! We picked up the chetnik communications, they said they had been attacked by our special forces. They really did. And later, we had a very successful fight with what they call the Drina Wolves. Haset's Swans, the 242d, the 246th ... and the chetniks were fleeing with their tails between their legs.

The Brigade Is a Congregation

[Haskovic] The Sarajevo battlefield, Srebrenica, and finally formation of the new brigade?

[Hadzic] We were on the Sarajevo battlefield, during the night we moved to help the people of Srebrenica. We did as much as we could. Today there are many heroes of Srebrenica in our brigade.... The 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade was formed (in August '95) from several units of the 2d Corps. These are all hardened fighters who had waged war all over the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These are the heroes of the units Sultan Fatih, Sheikh Hasan Kalmija, Bosnian Dragon, Mujahid.... On the Ozren battlefield we showed that we are the best when we are together. The officer corps is also a group of ardent warriors, good believers. The mufti of Tuzla, Husejn al Havazovic did the most to form our brigade. He is our spiritual leader. He is the brigade's emir.

[Haskovic] Why the 9th?

[Hadzic] There were various proposals for the name of the brigade: the 2d, the 9th, the 12th.... The 7th already existed. These were all were good numbers. The Zenica 7th, and then the 2d Corps, so, good numbers.

[Haskovic] Fighters from almost all opstinas in the TP [expansion unknown] cantons, and still one congregation?

[Hadzic] Really. This is something more than a military institution, a unit. A family, a constituency, a congregation, and Allah's cord binding the fighting men together, binding the Muslims together. The 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade was supposed to be the Zenica 7th. It is logical that even today we get the greatest help from Brigadier Halil Brzina. His help is certainly daily; when we get in a bind, Sheikh Brzina is there for us. The code of behavior of the Mujahid Knights is, of course, the code of behavior of Muslims.

[Haskovic] The roar of the Drina, commander?

[Hadzic] The chetniks call the Drina the backbone of the Serbs. The Drina people call the Drina their soul. It is well known that a man can live even with a broken back, but without a soul?!! We people from the Drina cannot live without our soul! Take the Drina from us, you mutilate our soul. The soul can be taken from a man only by He who has given it, and that is Allah, his name be praised. I trust our political leadership, I believe that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, our president, although in an extremely difficult situation, would never do anything harmful to the Bosnian Muslims. He will gather strength to make the fairest decision. My fighters and I, with Allah's aid, will respect that decision. I think that is enough.

[Haskovic] Many do not hear the roar of the Drina?

[Hadzic] For the first time in the history of the Bosnian Muslim people we are being given an opportunity to have our own state. Many were afraid of this reward from Allah, this temptation. There are more Muslims in Germany and in France than in Bosnia. Nobody is killing them, They are not bothered by the Muslims. Why? They are not an entity, they are not organized so that they could have their state. Allah, his name be praised, made a gift to us of a blessing for us to have our own state. This is at the same time a problem for those who have learned to be good servants to a bad master. They were afraid of the temptation and left their state. Those who have recognized the truth about the temptation have remained and defended their people. So, the burden of the refugees is also on my shoulders, the reason why I am saying something that perhaps might be a message to all the refugees. A message and a lesson! I carry on my shoulders the past, the present, and the future. The present: war, slaughter, and the displaced persons, the mutilated, the unfortunate, the scattered... The past has remained on the Drina. That is where my roots and my monuments are. My ancestors. The past is everything that I have in my refugee [word illegible]. It is up to me to move into what has passed and to draw people to myself with the roar of the Drina. The future is a spider's thread which links periods of time together. The roots of my 9th are Islam, the Koran. For the spider's thread to become like a Rubicon between the times which are deposited in me. First, I must go back to the original, that is, to the Koran. Everything is written there, the roar of the Drina and the pathways which lead to the Drina. [Word illegible] understand the message and the lesson of what is written. And that is why I have to say to my brothers abroad to come back, to fall in beside us, since we are too small a people to renounce our brothers in the faith. I repeat, our Rubicon in this world is on the Drina.

Islamic Community Expresses Gratitude to Mujahidin

AU2512202495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Muslim Press Agency MINA today conveyed the gratitude of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the mujahidin:

In the year of 1413, that is, 1992, the Serbo-Montenegrin Army committed aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina and started committing genocide against the Muslim people before the entire world.

Being confronted with the greatest suffering, political and religious representatives of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina appealed to the international community, European institutions, Islamic countries, and all those who could work on stopping genocide against the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The UN Security Council adopted many resolutions that condemned the aggression against Bosnia and the genocide against Muslims. Unfortunately, these resolutions could not stop the suffering of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, Bosniaks were forced to defend themselves from the Serbo-Montenegrin crime. They called on the world to join them. This appeal was their human right, and the world had the obligation to respond to it. (?Not only once) in history, a people exposed to crime called on other peoples to help them in their just struggle.

Judging that it is their right and obligation to fight against evil, and disappointed with Europe's indifferent attitude toward human rights of the westernmost Muslim people in Europe, people from the Muslim world were coming to Bosnia and helping our people to save itself from Serb fascism. In this way, the Islamic Community in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina expresses its gratitude to the mujahidin from the Islamic world for their sacrifice and the good that they left in Bosnia as a pledge for the future generations of all peoples in our homeland.

We want peace to reign in Bosnia and pray to God to reward our mujahidin brothers from the Islamic world for the help that they offered to us.

Banja Luka TV on Mujahidin 'Threat' to IFOR

AU2712114995 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 26 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Only in the past couple of days has the West realized that Islamic warriors, the so-called mujahidins, pose a threat to IFOR [Implementation Force] troops. Alija Izetbegovic did not fulfill his promise to deport the mujahidins. What is more, he even gave them Bosnian passports and those fanatics are now citizens of the so-called Muslim-Croat federation.

[Unidentified correspondent] What the Western European press says about the Islamic mujahidins in former Bosnia, and the way the Western European military officials talk about them, indicates that the attitude of the West toward the Muslim government is changing. During the 44 months of war, the West ignored and often laughed at the warnings of the Serbs that the Muslim government in Sarajevo was turning former Bosnia-Herzegovina into a radical Islamic country in which they could not and did not want to live. In the past two weeks, the Western media have kept repeating, on a daily basis, almost every hour, that the Islamic mujahidins, mercenaries and volunteers from Islamic countries, pose a serious threat to their troops in former Bosnia. It is difficult to comprehend a statement about such a military peril. There are about 7,000 Islamic mujahidins in former Bosnia. On the other hand, NATO is bringing more than 60,000 soldiers into former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such a force is undoubtedly able to cope with a handful of Islamic fanatics. Stories about their hazardous presence could only be explained as propaganda by the Western information machinery to pave the way for a process that will turn Bosnia-Herzegovina into a multinational state. According to the peace agreement initialed in Dayton on 21 November and signed in Paris on 14 December, there is no place for mujahidins in former Bosnia, but Alija Izetbegovic is obviously looking for a way to keep them. Mujahidins should leave former Bosnia by 14 January at the latest, but, so far, there have been no reports that they started to leave. Quite the contrary, a statement from Sarajevo says that they will leave only after all foreign soldiers have left former Bosnia.

Army Expected To Retake Slavonia by February

AU2712094395 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 22 Dec 95 p 4

["Exclusive" commentary by Davor Butkovic: "Diplomats in Zagreb Announce: Croatian Army Will Liberate Eastern Slavonia as Early as February in Only 24 Hours!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The war for the liberation of eastern Slavonia and Baranja could, despite the initialing of the general peace agreement in Dayton and the signing of the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Paris, start as early as at the middle of February.

Diplomatic sources in Zagreb, relying upon certain announcements and appraisals from official Croatian circles, think that Croatian military action will impose itself on Croatia as the only solution unless Slobodan Milosevic agrees as soon as possible to mutual recognition of Croatia and Yugoslavia without the exchange of territories in advance.

This is the context in which one interprets the statement of Dr. Mate Granic, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the conference on disarmament in the territory of former Yugoslavia, which started in Germany on 18 December 1995, when he announced that Croatia would not agree to build down its armed force according to the peace agreements signed, if there was no mutual recognition.

Simultaneously with this statement of Granic's, instead of the announced large-scale demobilization, there was a regular reinforcement of the units on the ground as has been done in the past twelve months.

What is actually going on? Croatian state top needed the mutual recognition of the Republic of Croatia and Federal Republic Yugoslavia badly, although it has provoked mainly negative reactions among the Croatian public, because it was the only real firm political profit for Zagreb in the peace process.

Prevlaka Was Crucial

Everything else Dr. Franjo Tudjman signed, from the viewpoint of the national interests, is either of secondary importance, or even has distinctly negative consequences (like giving up Posavina), or it creates huge problems within the party (extinguishing of Herzeg-Bosnia and Croatia's consent to cooperate with the Hague War Crimes Tribunal).

The mutual recognition would guarantee that the Republic of Croatia will get out of the peace process with its state borders definitely verified. Had Slobodan Milosevic really signed that eastern Slavonia and Baranja belong to Croatia, the Croatian leadership would have tried to, for many reasons, present that as its largest triumph, by which all the possible compromises in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be justified, and even the later, expected, compromises about the speed of the reintegration of eastern Slavonia into Croatian legal and political establishment.

Contrary to the official statements of Croatian negotiators and leading foreign diplomats who took part in the peace process, during the whole course of the Dayton negotiations the Croats and the Serbs were also talking about Prevlaka.

It did not appear as a problem at the certain point during the negotiations—as the president of the Republic claims in his Epistle from November—but it was constantly the most disputable item, which, in the end, frustrated the signing of the recognition.

True, Milosevic agreed in Dayton to the mutual recognition of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that only after the signing of the recognition would an agreement on the exchange of territories be reached.

However, in the night on the eve of the Paris meeting, the Serbs officially stated that they did not agree to the recognition before Croatia agrees to the exchange of territories, that is, before it officially gives up a part of the Dubrovnik seaboard in favor of the Bosnian Serbs.

Here one has to say that it is not only the question of Prevlaka, which is also confirmed by the official statement of Hrvoje Sarinic, issued two months ago. Asked by a journalist whether it was possible to sacrifice Prevlaka in exchange for the recognition and the final end of war, he answered resolutely: "Prevlaka is too small a stake. It is something much bigger..."

Will Serbia Go to War Again?

Croatia, of course, could not consent to that Serbian proposal, by which the peace process has really been endangered, but simultaneously, for the first time after the serious accusations against Croatia of the crimes committed after Operation Storm, diplomatic conditions for a new military operation started to arise. Namely, Croatia can once again, convincingly and with perfectly good reason, accuse the Serb side of not allowing peaceful reintegration of its territory.

Simultaneously, Yugoslavia must no longer intervene militarily in eastern Slavonia, because otherwise it would immediately be subject to the economic sanctions.

It has been assessed that the Serb state leadership would not take a risk of a new international isolation precisely at the time when, finally, after four years, foreign trade is waking up and when, for instance, the ambassadors of the European Union intend to return to Belgrade.

The Zagreb diplomatic circles estimate that President Tudjman will wait to gather enough hard evidences that peaceful reintegration can no longer be carried out, and then he will order a military intervention.

It is thought that the key question will be the demilitarization of eastern Slavonia and the deployment of the new international units in the former UN Sector East.

The Croatian representatives have on many occasions, both in the official statements and in the briefings, confirmed that they would not allow the demilitarization process to take more than thirty days from the moment of the deployment of the new international forces.

It is highly probable that the Americans will not come to eastern Slavonia. They have several times refused to send their units to the former Sector East.

It is also probable that the international units in eastern Slavonia will not be a part of the NATO forces.

One Zagreb diplomat describes the new forces for eastern Slavonia as the European Union Special Task Forces, that is, as a contemporary formation, mainly consisting of the European Union countries, made only for this occasion, the command of which will rest with the civil administrator for eastern Slavonia from the United States.

As Croatia has already rejected Butrus Butrus-Ghali's proposal on the deployment and the number of international forces for eastern Slavonia—which would in fact petrify the present situation—and as there will be neither NATO nor the American troops in eastern Slavonia, the contemporary military formation of the European community will, certainly, be no real obstacle to the military reintegration of eastern Slavonia.

The most important thing is that Croatia—if Milosevic does not agree to mutual recognition without the exchange of territories—will not be punished by sanctions if its army started for eastern Slavonia.

Zagreb diplomatic circles assess, unless the so-called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia becomes involved in the fighting directly, it should not take more than 24 hours for the Croatian Army to liberate eastern Slavonia and Baranja.

The military liberation of eastern Slavonia would, certainly, cause a new large-scale emigration of the Serb population into Yugoslavia. But, if the operation were to be carried out in a militarily correct way, without atrocities against civilians, the international community would not appraise that emigration as ethnic cleansing organized by the Croatian Government.

Final Decision in February?

Namely, in case of the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, too, the international political factors have predicted that the majority of the Serbs would move into Yugoslavia, and the Croatian state leadership agrees with that assessment.

According to the U.S. assessment, in eastern Slavonia—if there really is peaceful reintegration—out of the present number at the most 30 percent of the Serbs will stay, while the Croatian assessment is a bit lower: this calculation is that some 15 to 20 percent of the Serbs would stay in eastern Slavonia and Baranja after the establishment of the Croatian legal system.

It is therefore obvious that the question of lasting peace in eastern Slavonia is planned to be solved by the departure of the major part of the Serb population to Yugoslavia, by which, in fact, the process of the major exchange of population that started more than four years ago would be finished.

A military action in the former Sector East would only accelerate such a solution.

Since Croatia, unless Milosevic agrees to mutual recognition, will not be under threat of sanctions because of its possible military operation, since it is not likely that the process of the demilitarization of eastern Slavonia will develop at the speed on which Croatia insists, and, finally, regarding the announcement of Zagreb that it will wait for the beginning of the real reintegration of eastern Slavonia for only a month from the day of the deployment of the new international troops, one can reasonably presume that in the next couple of months—perhaps as early as in February—the Croatian Army will liberate the remaining occupied parts of the country.

Opinion Survey Carried Out Among 700 Persons From All Over Croatia

Do you think eastern Slavonia will be peacefully reintegrated?

	Percent
Yes	35.1
No	49.6
Do not know	15.3

Would you support a military action for the liberation of eastern Slavonia?

	Percent
Yes	64.9

Would you support a military action for the liberation of eastern Slavonia?	
No	22.1
Do not know	13.0

If there is no peaceful reintegration, do you think Dr. Tudjman will order a military action to liberate eastern Slavonia?	
	Percent
Yes	72.6
No	12.8
Do not know	14.6

UN Resolution Wording on War Crimes 'Diluted'

AU2712124995 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Dec 95 p 3

[Article by Bruno Lopandic: "The Treatment of Criminals Has Diluted the Resolution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As was more or less expected, the UN Security Council has adopted a resolution by which NATO is empowered to implement the peace treaty in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO has been given "the blessing" for robust action under the "Article VII, the war article," so that all tasks defined by the military annex of the Dayton document can be carried out.

The "more or less" refers to the part of the resolution that refers to the behavior of the Ifor [Implementation Force] toward war criminals, who have either been convicted or accused in the Hague. It was explicitly stated in the working document, which circulated among the representatives of the UN Security Council member states for days, that Ifor's members would have the power to arrest and extradite the persons accused by the Hague tribunal. In the adopted version, however, this formulation turned into the softer version: The sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina will cooperate with the court in the Hague and fulfill its orders. Although Mrs. Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, pointed out that NATO could empower Ifor to extradite the accused war criminals to the court in the Hague, or arrest them, that part of Ifor's role remained completely unclear because of the changes made at the last moment. Therefore, Resolution 1031 does not explicitly state what will happen with the people accused of war crimes, although this was planned.

Cynical Commentaries

According to diplomatic sources, everything had been agreed upon already during the elaboration of the working version of the resolution, "but a country opposed it, so that the thing that had already been agreed upon, was returned to the starting point." The discussion, which was—according to diplomats—the only reason that the adoption of the resolution was postponed, was related to the following two points: Whether to grant Ifor members the right to arrest war criminals and give them precise information on what to do with them if they have been arrested. This is the point at which the already firm arrangement about the treatment of war criminals collapsed.

The arguments of the country "that opposed the working document" (and it is probably not difficult to detect it) were that Ifor could not play the role of a big sheriff in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that it should not be given broader powers than those defined by the military annex of the peace treaty. It was claimed by some UN Security Council members that these powers were too broad anyway. The initial enthusiasm that Karadzic, for example, could fall into the hands of Ifor's members, and then, logically, be brought to the accused bench in the Hague, has considerably decreased because of the diluted regulation.

The defense against the criticism that has already come has started. "If these people fall into our hands, they will be arrested and handed over to temporary authorities. Unfortunately, we still do not know who represents these authorities," one diplomat told us. This sentence shows the incompleteness of the document; it allegedly has political reasons—the eternal and "sacred" diplomatic aim of adopting balanced decisions at the highest level. The "adapted" decision shows as early as at the beginning of the operation that it will be very difficult to achieve in practice what NATO's political planners in Brussels like to call joint efforts for the establishment of security in Europe. It is perhaps necessary to mention a cynical diplomatic commentary: "We should perhaps not worry so much about the incompleteness, since there are more Croats on the list of war criminals than Serbs."

Still, should all this be placed in connection with the bizarre play made about the release of the French pilots from Mladic's hands, with the alleged French promises about their indulgence toward Bosnian Serbs, or with the Russian initiative for the establishment of Karadzic's immunity, which was later denied by official Moscow? Seen from a political point of view, so long as the different interests of the superpowers have not completely shaped up, war criminals in the Hague could become very unpleasant witnesses of the task they have only been the performers of.

Resolution About Srebrenica

Only a few days before the final decision was adopted, both by NATO and the UN Security Councils, NATO ordered from a translation agency the translation of a small brochure into the languages of the people of the former Yugoslavia. The 40-page brochure explains what Ifor is, what its powers and duties are, and it contains instructions for the local population on how to behave toward the soldiers. Soon after work started on the translation, the agency was told to stop "since there could be some changes." Was the issue of war criminals controversial? It is possible that the contents of the brochure were prepared in the same way as the resolution—the working version being rejected.

According to the current situation, NATO has serious problems in achieving the unity with its European partners in at least two matters, which is even admitted by high-ranking NATO officials in Brussels. The first is the treatment of war criminals in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the other the plans for arming the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There has already been resistance in Europe toward both issues. Regarding war criminals some people hope that Karadzic's and Mladic's destiny could become more clear after the resolution about Srebrenica and Zepa has been adopted, in which both are mentioned by name. It is unofficially claimed that the author of the draft resolution is Germany, and that it could be adopted this week.

Personnel Appointments by Tudjman Critiqued

AU2712130395 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 22 Dec 95 p 2

[Article by Drazen Vukov Colic: "President's Gifts to Zagreb and Bonn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Only two days before Christmas the president of the republic and the ruling party publicly announced two personnel gifts to Zagreb and Bonn. These are more likely to be a token of Christian charity for those who are being given presents than deserved respect for those to whom that something is being given. Because neither Branko Miksa, artificial mayor of Zagreb, who should take over the distinguished post of Croatian ambassador to Bonn in late February, nor Ivan Majdak, the invisible advisor of the government, whom the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] is pushing forward as obligatory successor to Miksa in Zagreb, are people whose primary recommendation for such excellent offices is success, only success, and—nothing but success. Both are favorites of the president, who could have been pushed anywhere at all in order to obediently patch up some hole. Both are pursued by the scandals that have never been cleared up. Miksa has been accused of numerous fishy deals, and Majdak barely saved his head from the scandal that even the ruling party's representatives linked with the public managing of the Croatian Forests as early as at the time when Majdak was Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in Nikica Valentic's government.

Miksa could not even pass through a very wide election funnel of the ruling party's Zagreb branch while he defeated Ivo Skrabalo, his liberal opponent in the recent parliamentary elections in a very suspicious way. Only those very well versed in the Croatian personnel merry-go-round could guess that Ivan Majdak, 53-year old veterinary physician from Miholjac, former director of "Veterinaria," Tudjman's former adviser for economy and regional development and Valentic's minister, is still Zlatko Matesa's adviser in the role of "coordinator for the recently liberated areas." The general public has never had an opportunity to find out in detail what this expert in calves and maize had done in that office, although it is as if one can already almost talk about a consensus between the opposition and dissatisfied members of the ruling party—that in those areas too many things have happened that should not have happened, and that too many things have been omitted without which nothing could have been started. Offended Zagreb could perhaps, at least at heart, be flattered by a Greguric, but it would hardly accept that precisely Majdak is the best man to be the emergency administrator of the "metropolis that is more important than the metropolis."

Such "banishment under cover of a distinguished promotion" is common in all diplomatic services in the world, so it must be applicable to the president's more and more frequent practice of using the otherwise very decent Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a garbage bin. Here Miksa has at least the advantage he had spent some time and worked in Germany, so he did not fall from nowhere, as happened to Ivan Parac, who nevertheless had to leave the state short-sighted television and the cathedral of the stagnant Croatian spirit, so that he could immediately become an ambassador for whom one still has to find an embassy. Although Germany is in the group of those too important countries in which the president or ministers are primarily "the ambassadors of their own selves," it seems that Miksa is condemned in advance, even more than usual, to decorative diplomacy in Bonn, in which an ambassador visits fashion shows, while a minister nevertheless leaves the most important things to someone else.

True, someone will say that even U.S. diplomatic history is replete with jokes about rather stupid U.S. ambassadors who have bought the president's sympathy with election money, but those stories nevertheless belong to an outdated political folklore, although even today loyalty to the president is a key advantage. It must necessarily be supplemented, however, with many other virtues that are very closely checked by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, without the approval of which then there is no appointment. Many diplomatic careers have collapsed in this last leap through the parliamentary ring of fire, and Clinton has recently had to wait for almost three months for approval of the appointment of 18 new ambassadors (among which is the one to China) because the chairman of that committee, eternal Senator Jesse Helms, did not want to organize an official vote until Clinton had fulfilled—some of his quite separate requests.

In the end a compromise has been reached, and Clinton has not disputed Helms's legitimacy at any moment, or accused him of publicly standing at the head of some kind of conspiracy—which could "cause a state crisis" between Beijing and Washington. In that "pure presidential system" the president primarily respects some domestic political rules on the distribution of power and authority, while in the Croatian "semi-presidential system" the president is allowed willfully, without any control, to choose, and to behave like a self-willed supervisor over those who have been—elected in a democratic way. No opposition for the elected is allowed by the most recent proposals, while the telephone lines between Zagreb and Belgrade are being restored regardless of Bulatovic's and Milosevic's blackmail over Prevlaka, only a couple of days after the president himself had asserted that this shocking absence of recognition would freeze everything else. It is nice to make telephone calls all over the world, but one cannot constantly take the receiver off the hook at home.

Air Force Buys Brazilian Tucano Trainers

AU2212191795 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Dec 95 p 7-8

["Exclusive" article by Mario Galic: "Brazilian Tucano in Croatian Sky!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While the Croatian public debates which new combat aircraft will replace the current MiG-21, the Croatian Air Force is buying the Tucano EMB-312 turboprop trainer.

The decision to buy a training plane immediately after the lifting of the embargo is, in fact, most logical, because every air force consists, first, of men and only then of aircraft. True, Croatia can buy any combat aircraft it wants but not the pilots. Their education lasts at least 10, and sometimes more, years from the moment they enroll in aviation school to the moment they can sit at the control-panel of an F-16.

The decision to purchase a specified-purpose turboprop aircraft for the training of new pilots was made approximately two years ago. However, the arms embargo has permitted only preliminary talks with foreign manufacturers. Thus the first negotiations on the purchase of a Tucano with the Brazilian company Embraer started as early as toward the end of 1993, but all until now the contract could not be signed. Only the recent UN Security Council resolution on the lifting of the arms embargo for the countries in the territory of former Yugoslavia made it possible to sign the contract.

Tucano was first constructed for the Brazilian Air Force, but it has very quickly become the Brazilian military industry's best export product. More than 500 Tucanos have hitherto been sold to countries like France, Argentina, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran, and to many others. The British RAF has also chosen this aircraft, so the British company Short Brothers has purchased the license for production. All this is the best evidence that the Croatian Air Force has really chosen one of the best training planes.

Deadliness Under Wings

But why on earth one should buy the Tucano? So far the Croatian flying cadets have been acquiring their practical knowledge and experiences of flying on the UTVA [Wild Duck] 75 light aircraft, which are suitable for basic flying training. Military pilots must, however, acquire flying experience of far more movable aircraft that can simulate, to a certain degree, the flying features of jet aircraft. The Tucano is precisely such an aircraft, equipped with one Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-25C turbopropelled powerplant, with 750 horsepower, which suffices to bring this light aircraft (maximum take-off weight is 3,175 kilograms) to a maximum speed of 458 km/h. The Tucano can stay in the air for more that six hours and has a flying range of up to 1,840 kilometers. The British use Garrett TPE 331-12B powerplants in their Tucanos, maximum power of 1,100 horse- power. Thus the British Tucanos can reach a maximum speed of 513 km/h, while all other characteristics are in general the same as in the Brazilian original.

Besides that, this slender and swift airplane has got a cockpit arranged on the model of larger combat airplanes. That means that the instructor sits in an elevated seat behind the pupil just like in jet training and combat airplanes. For better safety very modern and light catapult seats have been used, which provide for a rapid exit from the aircraft in the event of an emergency, while the cockpit itself is under pressure, which makes flying at higher altitudes possible. That is not insignificant, if one takes into consideration that the Tucano can fly at altitudes over eight kilometers.

This training plane can also be used for combat purposes, because it can carry a metric ton of weapons under its wings. Its armament consists of containers with machine guns and cannons, and unguided missiles and traditional bombs. If it does not carry weapons, the Tucano can carry two additional fuel-tanks with 660 liters of fuel each. An aircraft 9.86 meters long with a wing span of 11.14 meters does not need a long runway. It needs a runway only 665 m long to land, while an 820 m long runway suffices for take off. A strong construction of its fuselage can stand pressure from +6 to -3 gravitaty acceleration, which is more than enough for young pilots to learn how to fly under pressures that occur with the much faster combat aircraft. Besides, because of its maneuverability, it is possible to use the Tucano for training for almost all combat maneuvers, and their exercise.

The decision to make the Tucano the Croatian Air Force basic trainer will certainly pay. Meanwhile, the purchase itself will not satisfy all the needs of the process of education of new military pilots. In a year at the latest, Croatia will have to buy one more type of training aircraft. This time, it will have to be a jet aircraft, because without it the final phase of the training of military pilots cannot be carried out. There are more than fifteen training jet aircraft but, it seems, the HZS [Croatian Air Force] will purchase an L-139, made in the Czech Republic. This aircraft has its origin in the L-39 Albatross trainer, which was made for the Warsaw Pact countries.

Training Jet Aircraft Soon, Too

After the Warsaw Treaty disintegrated, the Czechs in 1990 started to work on a far-reaching modernization of this aircraft to compete in the world market. The biggest change has been made in the engine. Instead of the old Ivicenko AI-25TL engine, they have used Garrett 731-4 engine in the L-139. A reconstructed prototype was tested in May 1993. On the occasion of the test flights, it reached a maximum speed of 765 km/h, and maximum range of 1,650 km. Beside the change of engine, the cockpit itself has undergone changes. The L-139 was supplied with western electronics that enables it to serve in training for all combat tasks. The aircraft's central computer makes it possible to show solutions for attacks on air or surface targets on the screen. In that way the cadets could have that kind of training, before getting into real combat aircraft, which cost several times more to fly per hour than a trainer like the L-139. This airplane can carry as much as 1,100 kg of bombs and missiles, and a container with a 23 mm two-barreled gun under the fuselage.

As far as is known, the final decision on the purchase of a new training plane has still not been made, and other types have been mentioned. Let us mention some of them: Italian company Aermacchi SpA produces the M.B.339 training plane, maximum speed 898 km/h and maximum range 1,760 km. An M.B.339 can carry 1,814 kg of weapons. British Aerospace Aircraft Group has been producing an exceptionally good Hawk training plane since 1976, maximum speed 1,040 km/h. The Hawk carries up to 908 kg of weapons, among other things, and guided antiaircraft and anti-ship missiles. The U.S. Navy has chosen it for its needs, so that McDonnell Douglas company has purchased the license for the production of 304 aircraft of that type.

In the middle of the seventies the German company Dornier and French Avions Marcel Dassault-Bregeuer Aviation developed the Alpha Jet training and combat aircraft. By purchasing that plane the Croatian Air Force would at the same time get a training jet aircraft, as well as a perfectly effective light combat plane, because the Alpha Jet can carry up to 2,500 kg of weapons, thus, more than an Eagle. It has a maximum speed of 1,000 km/h and range of 1,230 km. Meanwhile, this aircraft has two powerful engines that increase flying safety, but at the same time increase maintenance costs. On the other hand, we would get a combat aircraft that, at somewhat higher price, satisfies needs both in terms of pilot training and the execution of combat tasks on the targets on land and sea. The Alpha Jet would be a really good support for the future Croatian multi-role combat aircraft like the F-16 or Mirage 2000. Such a role would also justify increased maintenance costs. Besides, the Croatian Air Force should tend to purchase combat planes that will be equally efficient in handling at least two or more different tasks.

Expensive Training

The purchase of new training aircraft will certainly be the HZS's biggest expense in the next five years, though part of the funds will be spent for other needs related to the training of the future military pilots. Thus, the problem of the standard of the training of pilot cadets must be solved as soon as possible. That means solving the question of their accommodation during their training, and the question of scholarships, because a military pilot's training lasts a decade, until he is fully mature as a combat aircraft pilot. Besides, on average, only 1 percent of the cadets enrolled in the Air Force Academies satisfies the rigid health and expert criteria necessary for flying a combat aircraft like the Fighting Falcon or MiG-29. In Croatia every year 60 youths decide to become military pilots. In four or five years, in the best case only about 10—and in the worst case three or four—of them will be able to fly modern Croatian Air Force combat aircraft, provided they successfully complete their whole training. The remaining fifty will become combat helicopter pilots or cargo plane pilots. Therefore it is not a strange decision, immediately after the lifting of the arms embargo, to purchase training, and not combat planes, and thus create conditions for the youths who are now learning to become future military pilots, to actually become military pilots in four to five years. Because what would be the use of buying a hundred F-16s tomorrow if there is no one to fly them?

Foreign Minister Supports Corridor 'Crossroads'

AU2612180095 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 GMT 25 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Stevo Crvenkovski: "During the definition of the mandate of the EU for an agreement on cooperation with the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Greece was actively promoting some positive elements in this agreement because it is in its interest to be included in a more active cooperation with us also through the EU. However, we must reemphasize that we must not be submitted to momentary political atmosphere in one or the other direction in relation to the transportation net of the Republic of Macedonia. Throughout these years, when it was very important for us to promote the East-West corridor, I was repeating that the north-south corridor must not be neglected. This is perhaps the moment to say the reverse: If the north-south corridor starts functioning normally, we must not neglect the East-West corridor, because the Republic of Macedonia can profit from its geographical position in the Balkans only if the crossroads of these two directions is in the Republic of Macedonia. They will be of importance only if they are both developed. Now, and in the future, we must insist on connections toward Burgas [Bulgaria] and Drac [Albania], particularly because Drac can be of great long-range interest for the whole region."

Relations With Liberia To Be Established Soon

AU2512200095 Skopje MIC in English 25 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] During his stay in Tel Aviv, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Supply of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Ivan Angelov had a meeting on Thursday [21 November] with the Liberian Minister of Agriculture Roland Massaquoi, who was also on a visit to Israel.

The two ministers discussed the possibility of eventual participation of Macedonian construction firms in building up Liberia. It was assessed that the mutual relations between the two countries should be made official.

DPM Leader Views Albanian MPs 'Frustration'

AU2712113995 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 26 Dec 95 p 8

[Interview with Tomislav Stojanovski, president of the Democratic Party of Macedonia, by Branko Geroski; place and date not given: "We Feel and Expose the Problems"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Party of Macedonia [DPM] believes that it was a big mistake not to consult or inform parliament about the Macedonian position on the division of forces and new map in the region with the Paris peace arrangement on former Yugoslavia. Party leader Tomislav Stojanovski says that he has submitted a request to the Assembly to ask the government to brief the next session with the aim of organizing a debate.

[Stojanovski] We can only presume that there were talks about our country and we can only assume our expectations. I personally believe that Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] must be an equal successor to the property of former Yugoslavia and thus avoid exploitation of the thesis that Macedonia has existed as a state only since 8 September 1991. In this sense we must not have a defensive policy, that is to pay back the debts of former Yugoslavia and not know what is to happen with the heritage.

There Is no Compromise About the Name

[Geroski] Does this mean that you do not accept any compromise with Serbia on the question of the continuity to former Yugoslavia?

[Stojanovski] For the DPM and for every citizen of this state such a solution may have temporary advantages, but I think that it can also have catastrophic consequences. The neighbors' views that Macedonia is an artificial creation of the Comintern, that it does not have any roots, history, or tradition will be intensified.... Nobody with a brain in this state can accept this.

[Geroski] Macedonia is officially discussing the differences about the name with Greece. Would the DPM accept a compromise on this issue?

[Stojanovski] I think that there are too many manipulations with public opinion regarding the formulation whether these are discussions or negotiations. For me personally, the act of sitting down to the diplomatic table is the only way to reach the optimum solutions. However, let us not have any illusions that it is one thing to discuss and another to negotiate. There are no discussions that are not negotiations. There is no alternative or solution for the DPM but the name Republic of Macedonia. Everything else will betray what we presented to the citizens when we ratified the Interim Accord with Greece, with which we gave up the flag and accepted a number of compromises with the aim of keeping the name.

[Geroski] The biggest opposition parties are outside parliament and this gives many people the right to conclude that the democratic processes have slowed down. What is the DPM's position as a modest parliamentary opposition party?

[Stojanovski] I fully agree and I always stress that the democratic processes are lagging behind. The reasons lie in the fact that the powerful opposition decided to exclude itself from parliament. This is assessment is beyond dispute, regardless of the inconsistencies and manipulations during the second parliamentary elections. The mistake that was made by the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the Democratic Party will have long-ranging negative consequences. I believe that they have become aware of their mistake. All of us together, as a parliamentary opposition, would have been able to do much more to avoid the mistakes in the next elections. We who are sitting in parliament call ourselves constructive opposition, but this is not at all sufficient. Nevertheless, I believe that the opposition outside parliament can learn from our example, which is that a few nightingales can announce the spring. Although we are few in number, we have succeeded in acting as a corrector to the government's policy, in fighting for the dignity and authority of the member of parliament, who has lately been particularly degraded. Members of parliament have now been transformed into ordinary voters in parliament. There are no alternative proposals, there is no imagination, there is not even engagement. I may also say that there is a lack of seriousness. We have postponed a number of sessions for lack of a quorum, and sometimes we work with the minimum quorum.

Classic Opposition

[Geroski] The opposition parties outside parliament believe that you are not only not a corrector of the government, but you are the decoration that provides for its legitimacy. What is your response to this comment?

[Stojanovski] Such objections are nothing but an insinuation that they are using with their electorate to justify their mistake. There are many arguments that speak of us as of a real opposition party, but a constructive one, because we give our vote to everything that is a good solution and of strategic importance to the state. Nevertheless, it is a fact that we opposed the election of the government. I did not give my vote either to the law on courts or to the law on local self-management, because I do not agree with many solutions that are given in these systems and key laws. My attitude in parliament can be monitored by the total population and I appreciate its reactions more than I appreciate any interparty discords and insinuations.

[Geroski] Gosev's Democratic Party announces a platform on minimum conditions for fair elections, which should be discussed by all opposition parties. Will you accept such discussions?

[Stojanovski] We will participate in all activities organized with the aim of speeding up the democratic processes, but normally, the basic precondition for this is regular and fair elections. We, in particular, are ready to discuss the completion of the election laws, regardless of which party may initiate such a discussion, unless we evaluate that it is a party's political marketing. We are open to cooperate with all, because as a party of the center, as a civil party, we are committed to this. Our goal is to act as a balance between the extremist left and the extremist right parties and I think that this is the image of the DPM that we are creating, and with success.

Burden Instead of Exclusivity

[Geroski] If you allow others to evaluate your image—there is an opinion that you, as the leader and member of parliament of your party, are the man who is constantly warning about interethnic relations. Why are you exclusively linked to this issue?

[Stojanovski] I think that this conclusion is exaggerated and even pushed too far. The truth is that I am no less active in the work of parliament when other bills are adopted as well. I am not a passive observer at all, particularly not when economic problems are dealt with. However, we must admit that these questions are often focused on problems from the interethnic sphere. Frequently, there are questions and problems that are not at all connected with interethnic relations and emotions, but whether we like it or not, because of the frustration of the Albanian colleagues, they are reduced to this sphere.

[Geroski] Nevertheless, you are much more exposed in this field than the other Macedonian members of parliament, probably because you are a Tetovo party.

[Stojanovski] The fact that we are much more exposed than the others in these sensitive subjects is quite normal considering that the party's headquarters is in Tetovo. In a sense, this represents an advantage for us—we feel these problems directly around us and we would be unfair to our membership and supporters, as well as to the whole Macedonian public in general, if we did not expose these questions and problems, which are as follows: The illegal university in Tetovo, the violation of the Constitution and laws by hoisting a foreign country's flag, the singing of a foreign anthem, the violation of laws on the names of the streets, companies, and institutions, and so on, because the law on self-management has not been and cannot be applied fully in a large number [of communities]. I do not find all this to be exclusive to the DPM, it is more a burden to it. However, what we have here, we have—if I personally and a great part of the leadership [of our party] live in the region of western Macedonia, it is normal for us to expose these problems. Let me correct you at once: We have a membership and very strong branches in other towns in Macedonia too, like Bitola, Strumica, Negotino, Kumanovo, and above all Skopje, where we have the largest number of members.

[Geroski] You are constantly criticizing the government for not dealing with interethnic relations appropriately. Where is the constructiveness here?

[Stojanovski] Your formulation "deal with appropriately" is somewhat irritating. We do not use such terms. Basically we criticize the government for its inertia and unwillingness to implement fully the bills that we adopt. Here lie our strongest remarks. We never react to activities in the sphere of interethnic relations if they are allowed by the Constitution and positive laws of the state. The para-army, the para-university, the illegal pedagogic evidence and documentation, the simultaneous translation in the Tetovo Communal Assembly, the one-national assemblies, the celebration of a foreign country's holiday, that is, of Albania, at a formal session of Gostivar Communal Assembly—are illegal activities to which we have reacted. We do not react to legal rights to equality, to equal rights. Nevertheless, I must immediately say that we do not understand democracy as the violation of laws and anarchy, because that is contrary to rights and duties.

Tension Seen Between Albanian 'Hawks,' Doves

AU2712130695 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 23-24 Dec 95 pp 6-7

[Commentary by Branko Geroski: "The Hawks Are Watching for Their Chance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The announcements that the Albanian parties in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] are thinking of leaving parliament and government have fostered comprehensive reactions among the distraught Macedonian public. Some of the hawks are appealing to the Albanian leaders to accept what they have or leave the government, by which they demonstrate that there is a lack of seriousness when some open questions in the sphere of interethnic relations are tackled. The trouble is even greater because Abdurahman Aliti, PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] leader, "understood" a statement made by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, who stated this in a completely different context (in commenting on the misunderstandings with the liberals), as a public message with which the prime minister is allegedly opening the doors and inviting the Albanians to step out. The misunderstanding came at a time when the atmosphere was heated by Minister of Culture Estref Aliu's "slipup," who attended the celebrations of Fadil Sulejmani's illegal Tetovo university.

Post-Party Strategy

Some people who know the circumstances well claim that this unpleasant situation should not be taken too seriously. On the other hand, the reactions of the incited public confirmed that in spite of the long-lasting peacefulness after the events that took place in the Tetovo village Mala Recica in February, the situation is still very tense. A spark or a small provocation would be enough to open up old polemics and disputes and even put at stake the key factor that has been maintaining interethnic peace in Macedonia for five years—the presence of the Albanians in the institutions of the system.

An analysis of the situation must not disregard the influence of the Paris peace conference. The fact that the Albanian question was not on the agenda in Paris has undoubtedly created disappointment and dissatisfaction among the Albanian politicians in the region. Tirana is now trying to channel this dissatisfaction into pressure over Belgrade to start negotiations between the Serbian authorities and the Albanian Kosovo leaders for restoration of autonomy to the former Yugoslav province that was suspended by Milosevic.

It seems to be clear, however, that Milosevic's regime, after his "peacemaking" in Dayton and Paris, can now reject or postpone these initiatives in a relatively comfortable way. The nervousness among the Albanian politicians is rising and it will most certainly be reflected in Macedonia. The Albanian leaders here will most probably try to open a debate on their position in Macedonia with the aim of strengthening the overall positions of the Albanian factor in the region. The PDP's announcements most likely represent markers of such a strategy.

This strategy is understandable. The Albanian politicians in the region are really facing a difficult and unpleasant situation. Their key demands—a state in Kosovo and the status of constitutional nation in Macedonia—are definitely deprived of a substantial international support. The sole chance for accomplishing at least a little bit is to induce a debate and a dispute between the Albanian communities in Kosovo and the Serbian authorities and, in Macedonia, with the Macedonian authorities, with the aim of urging the international community to discuss the subject that is now, after Dayton, wisely avoided (or reduced to discussions on human rights in Kosovo, and so on).

Contrary to the rule that says that all games are allowed in politics, the circumstances in Macedonia show the need for further caution. This refers equally to the Albanian and the Macedonian political elite. Namely, logic and experience say: Milosevic does not have a better way for alleviating international pressure for discussions on the southern province than shifting the focus from Kosovo to Macedonia. The climate in Macedonia is actually better than in Kosovo, but if Milosevic succeeds in proving that the Macedonian formula is not sustainable, he will have a strong justification for his policy in Kosovo.

In any case, the regime in Belgrade must not be blamed for all the emerging problems in Macedonia. The situation here is contradictory even without the unfavorable influence from the north: On the one hand, even when they argue, the two political elites in Macedonia are doing it with a dose of caution and respect for the partner; on the other hand, the hawks of the two sides can easily incite the masses with the aim of reinforcing the feeling that the benevolent elites do not have control over the situation. In this way the theses that "only Milosevic has a way with the Albanians" and that the "Albanians do not have anything to lose in Macedonia" will be promoted.

An Image Without Which it Is Impossible

In any way, if they radicalize relations, the two political elites will discredit their images on the international scene. The Macedonian ruling elite has long constructed a position in convincing the international community that it (and not the nationalist opposition) is capable of and ready to provide a tolerant dialogue and implement the constitutional body of law related to minority rights, with the aim of easing the extremist demands of the Albanian parties. This position of Gligorov's team has provided it with a substantial international support that has greatly affected the outcome of the internal political conflict between the creators of the policy of "coexistence" and the "nationalist opposition."

The PDP, contrary to all crises and problems in this period, has not given up its program determinations for reconstruction ("Albanians—constituent nation") and they have identified themselves on the international scene with their determination to participate in the institutions of the system and thus fulfill its goals. As Aliti the leader recently stated for VECER, his party has accepted the only possible logic: To accomplish what is mutually acceptable, to discuss matters that can be resolved quickly, and to put aside questions on which solutions cannot be reached in due time. The PDP has actually encouraged the reservations among its Macedonian parties by pushing the idea for the construction of parallel institutions (this was the reason that the liberals did not vote for the government), but peace was maintained in the house in any way.

Will the partners acquiesce to this burden without giving it necessary thought? Probably not, the fire will be probably extinguished again. Nevertheless, Aliti's warning words say that the "fire brigades'" activities are not a lasting solution. Progress is only possible if the deadlock in relations is lifted. Although it may sound heretical, it is true that the more powerful wili have to make the first steps in this direction, and that is the Macedonian partner.

Activities for a consistent implementation of constitutional minority rights must be intensified. The moderators of Gligorov's powerful formula on "coexistence" (many believe that this is an ideological term for which Macedonia had the exclusive chance in giving real contents to it, and this really happened to some extent in the past period) are expected to be more expressive and more creative. Aliti, who has been pressed to the wall now, bereft of trump cards for easing the pressure of the Albanian radicals in the electorate (elections in 1994 were a serious warning), will probably pay back by refraining from the creation of parallel institutions.

One day, the parties in this country may really become parties of citizens and not nationalist collectives. We may even dare forecast that this may happen here sooner than in any other parts in former Yugoslavia. However, such a constellation cannot be installed. There is such an installation in Serbia and it reminds one of a joke about the black and white population in South Africa—starting from today they are all green, light green in the front, and dark green in the back. Politics in the Balkans still functions on the level of political elites addressing their ethnic herd. It is unfortunate, but it is a fact. It is less expressed here than elsewhere, and yet.... The power, and the responsibility at the same time, is in the hands of the elites, politicians, and party leaderships.

Those who have decided to build stable interethnic relations in Macedonia cannot go back now. Even Aliti is aware of this. Outside the institutions some loud boys are playing the game and Aliti's chances there are small. If he decides to step out (because of absence of other alternatives or for other "strategic" reasons) the moderators of the Macedonian political elite will be restricted. The hawks are watching for their chance.

DP President Gosev Seeks 'Regular Elections'

AU2412170095 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 22 Dec 95 p 9

[Interview with Democratic Party President Petar Gosev by Branko Geroski; place and date not given: "We Are Not in a Weakened State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Geroski] Before the signing of the peace agreement on former Yugoslavia in Paris, Petar Gosev's Democratic Party [DP] warned the Macedonian authorities to be cautious about what they sign in the French capital and how they sign it. What was the reason for this opposition party's reservation and suspicion?

[Gosev] First, our representatives did not explain whether and with what status they were going to participate in the signing of the agreement. In addition to the general peace agreement, there are also many annexes whose contents we are not familiar with and which we do not know if they are favorable for the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Before Dayton, after Dayton, after London, or before Paris, our representatives' questions were not dealt answered, and it is normal that they have to know the matters in detail and inform the public. On the other hand, we received information on the possibility of reaching mutual recognition among the former Yugoslav republics in Paris and that Serbia was asking for a state and legal continuity as the only successor to Yugoslavia, not only of the one after the war [1945], but also of the one in 1919. We were informed that, in their mutual agreement, the gentlemen Tudjman and Milosevic had reached an agreement that Croatia would recognize it and that even Mr. Izetbegovic had agreed [to do the same].

Without Entanglements

[Geroski] What can that signify for Macedonia's future?

[Gosev] If Macedonia is not an equal successor to the former Yugoslav federation, it means that it became a state on 8 September 1991. This could bolster the theses that Macedonia is a Comintern creation and that the Macedonians are a newly composed nation.

[Geroski] After the establishment of relations with three neighbors, particularly after the unblocking in the dispute with Greece and the access to the key international institutions, Macedonia is now becoming a subject on the international scene. Your assessments give rise to a thesis that it is still an object of negotiations, trading, and marketing.

[Gosev] Many states are a subject and an object in international relations at the same time. Macedonia is a subject when it succeeds in reaching solutions that are in its own interest, and it is an object in cases when solutions do not depend on the wishes of its leadership and citizens. It is true that Macedonia has increased its subjectivity, that it is more and more accepted as a real factor in this sense. It is also true that many problems which represented a danger to its sovereignty have now been overcome. It is important that Bulgaria, in spite of all reservations that are unpleasant for us, has recognized us, as well as Albania, and it is also important (with all remarks again) that Greece has accepted on its northern border the existence of a state with which it directly or indirectly discusses about the solution of the problems.

[Geroski] However, we are very sensitive when the question of the fourth neighbor is raised. After the opening of the northern border and the new customs regime of the FR Yugoslavia, it seemed that some circles have remained disappointed. Why this sensitivity?

[Gosev] The sensitivity in regard to the northern neighbor is partly understandable. It has its own gravity. The northern neighbor is the biggest state in the region. It is glittering with the most positive or the most negative energy in the region around itself. The Yugoslav policy is important not only for Macedonia, but for the entire relations in the region and that is why I wish FR Yugoslavia and Serbia a democratic and economic progress. I also wish them to undertake activities in accordance with the economic and political principles of the European Union. The sensitivity is increased by the historical background—Macedonia was in community with the northern neighbor, it was its economic and political partner. There is another, third element: There had been many discussions, well-intentioned and ill-intentioned, well-assessed and ill-assessed, that Macedonia is a subject that cannot exist independently, without somebody's support. The sensibility related to the historical background in the last 50 years developed the feeling with some people that this support must come from the northern neighbor. I, normally, have always said that Macedonia is capable of developing its own independent, economic, political, and cultural life and that it does not need any "additional donations" to survive, all that it needs is no further entanglements, as always happened in its history.

Failed Separation

[Geroski] Some circles assess that there is a slowdown or uneven development of democratic processes.

[Gosev] There is no uneven development or a slowdown in the democratic processes in Macedonia. Our view is that we are going backward, regardless of the fact that some elements in the structure of the system pretend that there is pluralism in the society. This is the period in which violation of the constitution and laws is the greatest, and the citizens are not treated equally. On the top of the pyramid of formal and informal authority there is an interesting group that has been placed above the constitutional position of the institutions. We have totally failed on the plan of separation of the executive, the administrative, and the judiciary powers, which is the elementary condition for democracy. We claim that the election of the authority was irregular and we cannot talk about democracy without regular elections.

[Geroski] Contrary to all this, the assessments of independent international observers, which were based on a comparative analysis of regimes in transition, say that Macedonia is actually a successful regime in transition compared to the others, on the plan of democratic development as well as on the plan of general security. What is your comment on this fact?

[Gosev] Sometimes these assessments are correct, but sometimes they are unfortunately wrong and they are either in the interest of the observers themselves or of those whom they represent. They are sometimes a result of the impossibility of viewing the real situation in Macedonia because the visits are too short. These observers often think that before pluralism Macedonia was the same as Albania or Bulgaria or another socialist state.

[Geroski] Even without this "top" judgment of the observers, we ourselves can assess Macedonia's position compared to the others. Where is it, in your opinion?

[Gosev] In 1988-89 Macedonia was more advanced than Bulgaria and Albania.... At that time it was a subject in the channeling of democratic processes, it was not waiting to see what the others had to say before it made a move, as was always the case before. At that time we did not have such a dramatic economic situation. In 1990 we basically had regular elections, in 1994—we did not. In 1990 we got a pluralist parliament, in 1994 we lost it. Macedonia has not constituted its judiciary system in five years. The opposition's views are presented to the public opinion in small portions. We did not have such lawbreaking five years ago, we did not have organized crime within the ranks of the state administration, and the economic subjects were not selected according to declared or presumed political affiliation.

Minimum Conditions

[Georski] What are the ambitions of the DP for changing this situation, the way you present it, considering that you are outside parliament, and according to some views also in a weakened state?

[Gosev] You think that we are in a weakened state. We do not think so at all. After the elections, many thought that the DP would crash, but it has remained as a real alternative to the authority. The DP can do what a subject can do—it does not think that it is able to change relations in Macedonia by itself. All the other organized subjects will have to think about this, but also the citizens of Macedonia.

[Geroski] What is the minimum that can satisfy your party for participating in the next elections?

[Gosev] We must come to regular elections and we will fight for it. At this moment we are preparing a request on what the DP considers to be the minimum for regular elections. We will have consultations on this matter on two to three levels and we will ask for support. First, we will ask all the opposition parties to agree upon the election procedure and the basic solutions in the laws which regulate the elections. Second, we will inform the monitoring institutions of our views and we will ask them whether the requests are normal and in conformity with their judiciary systems, whether there is something unnatural in our requests that has not been confirmed in practice.... Third, we will ask to discuss these questions with the ruling parties, if they are willing to do this at all.

Russia's Yeltsin Invites Kwasniewski to Visit

LD2412162995 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1540 GMT 24 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 24 Dec—The president of the Polish Republic [RP], Aleksander Kwasniewski, yesterday received a letter of congratulations from Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian Federation, the President's Press Office reported today. Yeltsin invited the Polish president to pay an official visit to Russia in the first half of next year.

Congratulating Kwasniewski once again, this time in connection with the official accession to the eminent and responsible post of president of the RP, Yeltsin wished him success in the difficult presidential activity.

Stressing that he knew Kwasniewski's speeches after his election victory, Yeltsin underlined that he saw in them a determination to follow consistently the road of profound democratic transformations inside the country and to pursue a considered and realistic foreign policy. Yeltsin is convinced that this will serve the interests of the Polish nation, the noble goals of fruitful international cooperation, the strengthening of good-neighborliness between Poland and Russia.

Sharing some, as he wrote in the letter, opinions about the possible directions of joint activity, President Yeltsin stresses that Russia consistently comes out in favor of creating a new structure of the future Europe, oriented toward lasting, peaceful cooperation of all states and nations. Yeltsin stresses that commercial and economic cooperation has key significance in bilateral relations.

Expressing the view that a regular, personal exchange of views would promote to a great extent the execution of these tasks, Yeltsin invites the Polish presidnt to pay an official visit to the RF in the first half of 1996.

Russian Secret Services Spokesman on Oleksy

WS2712144295 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Dec 95 p 6

[PAP-attributed interview with the press spokesman of the Russian Federal Secret Services, General Alexandr Mikhailov, by Waldemar Gontarski; quoted from Radio RMF of 20 December, place not given: "Moscow Denies Oleksy Collaborated With the KGB; This Is a Political Provocation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Yesterday [20 December], Radio RMF correspondent Waldemar Gontarski talked to General Alexander Mikhailov, press spokesman for the Russian Federal Security Services.*

[Gontarski] What do the Russian Federal Security Services, as a successor of the KGB, make of the allegations that President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy collaborated with the Soviet secret services?

[Mikhailov] I thought the times when you could sling mud and fabricate charges against anyone were long since over. These revelations are completely absurd. This is a political provocation of some kind, a provocation against people who are successful in politics in Poland.

[Gontarski] Can you absolutely state that no materials exist which would prove that both Kwasniewski and Oleksy, or only one of them collaborated with the KGB?

[Mikhailov] Yes, I wish to state very firmly that no such materials exist.

[Gontarski] What if the Polish authorities, President Lech Walesa, present international public opinion with such documents?

[Mikhailov] President Walesa will find it very difficult to prove anything here, to present substantial proof. No one will confirm such cooperation existed.

[Gontarski] Do you not fear a state of emergency might be introduced in Poland?

[Mikhailov] Yes, I am afraid of a dirty political brawl.

Minister 'Blocked' Inquiry Into SLD-KGB Ties

WS2112142495 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 21 Dec 95 p 1

[Report by "PJW": "Old Connections With the KGB and CPSU"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish prosecutor general obtained the first documented proof of contacts between leaders of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the KGB in the course of an inquiry into the affair of the so-called Moscow money — the $1 million the dissolving Polish United Workers Party received from the CPSU. At more or less the same time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs received the first reports on regular meetings between prominent SLD activists and the future orchestrator of the Moscow coup, G.Y. Yanayev. The meetings took place at the Russian Embassy in Warsaw, the private apartments of KGB residents, and in Crimea during holidays spent together at a special recreation center for Polish comrades.

Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia ultimately blocked further investigation into the case. The majority of prosecutors who assisted him in this have been appointed to high posts at the prosecutor's office over the last few days. Those prosecutors who claim that the inquiry should be continued are being or will be dismissed in the nearest future.

Prosecutor on 'Gaps' in Oleksy Documentation

LD2212141995 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1330 GMT 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 22 Dec—The chief military prosecutor requested today that the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] complete the documentation concerning Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy's contacts with foreign intelligence.

According to General Ryszard Michalowski, the documents handed over to him by Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski have "certain gaps that, prior to such an important decision as instituting proceedings in the case, should not have happened." In this connection, Gen. Michalowski, who has familiarized himself with the Oleksy documentation, requested that it be completed in 12 subject areas "as soon as possible."

At the same time, the chief military prosecutor asked the head of the Military Information Services for "information concerning the scope and methods of activities of the special services of the former USSR and Russia."

Oleksy To Go on Leave

LD2212150795 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1427 GMT 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 22 Dec—Government Spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowksa said today that it is "the prime minister's intention" to take leave after Christmas in order not to influence in any way the decisions by the independent prosecutor's office. One of the deputy prime ministers will then take up the duties of acting prime minister.

The prime minister is also not going to make public statements or comment on activities until the matter is cleared, Jakubowska said. She stressed that the prime minister is ready to answer all questions asked by the prosecutor. Everything the prime minister had to say publicly he has said in his television address and in the Sejm, she added.

Asked how long the prime minister's leave is going to last, Jakubowska replied that the prime minister will remain on leave until he is sure that when he returns everyone will be certain that he is not attempting to influence the course of events.

Daily Comments on Kwasniewski's Inaugural Speech

WS2712154695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Piotr Stasinski: "These Words Were Not Spoken"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Aleksander Kwasniewski's primary task is to gain the credibility he needs if he is to perform in office. The inaugural speech he gave on Saturday [23 December], however, did not give much ground to believe he will succeed in doing so in the near future. Kwasniewski sees his presidency as open and modern. Yet his speech was greatly disappointing. The president avoided the slightest mention of the events that had rocked Poland just before he was sworn into office. We had a right to expect he would promise that as head of state he would do everything possible to clarify the charges brought against [Prime Minister] Jozef Oleksy by [Interior] Minister Milczanowski to the fullest extent possible, objectively and in line with the procedures of a democratic, legal state. We also expected an assurance that the president would make every effort to explain whether the secret services operated legitimately. This is a statement I would expect from the new president, whoever he was, but particularly from this one. He represents the same political camp as the prime minister, against whom the most serious charges have been brought, and the same camp as the prosecutor general who has proven himself to be politically biased. No such declaration came. Kwasniewski failed to guarantee he would honestly solve the "Oleksy affair." The way he solves this problem, however, will be a test for the new presidency.

Kwasniewski's inaugural speech contained words both important and needed: about the readiness for dialogue with the "opposition forces," with "those who doubt because they have an absolute right to doubt;" about not "putting a sign of equality between those who paid the price of imprisonment for their convictions and those who imprisoned them;" about the determination in aspiring to join the European structures and NATO; about the positive balance of the reforms that took place after 1989; about encouraging foreign investment in Poland; about the president's respect for his predecessors; about the readiness for a dialogue with the Church; and finally, the reference to the Polish left's tradition of independence and democracy, symbolized by such eminent figures as Jozef Pilsudski and Edward Lipinski.

There were, however, some unpleasant twists. Kwasniewski failed to make a serious assessment of the period of the Polish People's Republic [PRL], without which his appeal for the construction of a "Poland for all" and references to the Polish Socialist Party are not credible. He only shortly mentioned the outgoing president's achievements; he even went as far as to make petty and spiteful remarks (about "facade presidential councils," about a "court hiding in an ebony tower.") He hypocritically juxtaposed "the voice of the nation to the bedlam and pouting of the political parlors" (PRL propaganda used the phrase to sneer at public opinion). Aleksander Kwasniewski says that he owes everything he achieved to what he did for himself. He still has a lot of work ahead if his term in office is to do Poland any good.

To Start Work 27 Dec

LD2412153495 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1459 GMT 24 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The President's Press Office reports that the President of the Polish Republic, Aleksander Kwasniewski, will take up his official duties in the Namiestnikowski Palace on 27 December 1995 at 0650 GMT.

Kwasniewski Assesses Relations With France, Russia

BR2212131295 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 28 Dec 95 pp 92-93

[Interview with Polish President Kwasniewski in Warsaw by Francois Gault; date not given: "Kwasniewski: Women Like Me. My Wife Is Very Good on Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Gault] How do you view relations between France and Poland?

[Kwasniewski] They are very positive. France is a special case, because the Poles have loved your country and its mentality for almost 100 years. We have invested to a certain extent in France, and political relations are improving. However, we are slightly disappointed by France's attitude toward Germany. Germany has adopted a very clear stand on the EEC [as published] and the United Nations, whereas France seems to be distancing itself from both institutions. However, I know Alain Juppe, and I know that he will be keen to enlarge the European structures.

[Gault] How do you view relations with Russia?

[Kwasniewski] That is a very complex problem. It is our duty to maintain as good a relationship as possible with that country, both politically and economically. For the time being, however, we do not know which way Russia is headed, and we know all about Russian imperialism. However, I believe that Russia has every interest in developing democracy and the market economy. To my mind it is essential that there be good relations between our two countries, because we have common interests. My country needs Russian goods, and Russia also buys some of our products. The years 1995 and 1996 will be decisive for the future of Russia, and I hope that that vast nation will take the path to democracy.

[Gault] Your opponents call you a neo- or post- or ex-Communist...

[Kwasniewski] I do not like those kind of labels. They do not correspond to the reality of the situation. I was not an out-and-out Communist. Party members were above all opportunists and technocrats. However, there were reformers, too. I am a reformer and a democrat. I will be judged by my actions.

[Gault] How do you see the future of Walesa?

[Kwasniewski] He helped us build Poland into what it is today. Lech Walesa is not a man to stand idly by. We do not have to like each other, but we must work together as far as possible.

Ministry Refuses To Lift Kwasniewski's Immunity

LD2212160595 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1534 GMT 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 22 Dec—Unjustified, incomplete, premature—this is the preliminary assessment by the Ministry of Justice Prosecution Department of the application by the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw for the lifting of Aleksander Kwasniewski's parliamentary immunity for making a false declaration of his assets. The application will be returned to the prosecutor's office after the president-elect is sworn in on 23 December: the prosecutor's office should then discontinue proceedings in the case, Andrzej Cubala, Justice Ministry press spokesman, reported today.

Cubala said the application "was of a very low legal standard, as if somebody was in a hurry." [passage omitted]

Immunity Still Being Discussed

LD2212201995 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia has said that, despite the earlier statement by ministry spokesman Andrzej Cubala, the prosecutor general's office was still examining the application for the lifting of Aleksander Kwasniewski's parliamentary immunity. This application is linked to the president-elect's untrue declaration of his financial assets to the Sejm.

[Begin Jaskiernia recording] There were no new facts today. I did not authorize Mr. Cubala to make this type of declaration. Perhaps he knows some facts that I do not. [indistinct passage omitted] There is no such decision, but a decision may [?emerge]. Only the facts will decide this because there is no pressure here and no political action. If there is justification for the case to return to the provincial prosecutor's office, a decision will be made because only the law can decide on this matter. [end recording]

Walesa Urges 'Universal Values' in Public Life

LD2112135795 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1302 GMT 21 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 21 Dec (PAP)—During today's wafer-sharing meeting [traditional Catholic Christmas ceremony] with politicians, President Lech Walesa said that one cannot build the Third Republic on deceit and insinuation and on treating truth and justice with disregard.

"We have to build our Polish home on a solid foundation, on the 10 Commandments and moral order. We have to make sure that universal values will have a permanent place in our public life," the president said, adding that there were people in our country who wanted to avoid this common reflection and who threatened that this would divide Polish society, leading to tension and conflicts and the destabilization of the state.

"I definitely do not agree with this. One must not hide the truth irrespective of the price, one must not hide crime and treason behind a veil of silence. Tolerating evil brings another type of evil and makes us bear joint responsibility, and, moreover, it demoralizes others," the president said.

The president stressed that in his actions he was not guided by revenge and hatred. He said that he was guided only by the common good named Poland. "That is why I could not remain silent, that is why I made difficult decisions. When issues of utmost importance to the state are involved, one must not delay, one must not talk about proper or improper timing," Walesa added.

The president shared the wafer with politicians, associates, representatives of culture and science, and friends.

Prime Minister Comments on Madrid EU Summit

WS1912140295 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
18 Dec 95 pp 1, 6

[Statement by Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, "taken" by N. Szelestowska in Madrid; date not given: "Prime Minister for TRYBUNA: Poland Is More Than a Suppliant and Client"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Poland is more than a suppliant and client. It can, and should become a partner, *Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy told TRYBUNA in Madrid, when asked to comment on the results of the EU summit.* We have already met the requirements for members in certain areas, and are more advanced than certain countries which are to be admitted earlier. I would like to emphasize that we have many standards and parameters that are not worse than those which are compulsory in the EU. For example, we have a high dynamic economic growth, and our budget deficit will amount to 2.7 percent, at the same time as the ceiling for countries joining the monetary union was set at 3 percent. A similar situation exists with the public debt, which the EU says may amount to 60 percent, and we currently have a public debt this high, though it will soon decrease.

Although I am not completely satisfied with the results of the summit, and admit that I expected more, I presume that the year 2000 as a deadline for our admission is not going away, provided that the European Commission report on each country will be drawn up during an intergovernmental conference, and not after it.

Accession to the EU is our primary strategic goal, and it cannot be divided into components. As realists, we certainly may see certain stages of preparations and deadlines. It is true that it has so far been stated that associated countries have a number of responsibilities concerning their adjustment. And this is currently on the agenda in our country. I think, however, that one can also presume that the EU also must prepare for our membership. It will no longer be the same union in many respects, for example in terms of internal structures, methods of decisionmaking, budget, and finances. The challenge of preparing for membership is thus mutual. This challenge is greater for associated countries than for the EU, though it is still a mutual challenge.

While preparing for our country's accession to the EU, it must be said that Poland cannot afford such a level of isolationism as that which exists in the EU. And either the Union helps us financially, or it will have to alter its agricultural policy itself, which is not only Poland's opinion, but also an opinion inside the EU.

Olszewski's Movement Holds Congress, Elects Leaders

WS2112152695 Warsaw GAZETA POLSKA in Polish 21-28 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by T.S.: "ROP Congress; To Prevent Thieves From Governing the Country"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Today we should no longer talk about decommunization; we should start talking about the decriminalization of our political life," said Jan Olszewski during the congress of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP], which was held on 16 December in Warsaw. "Earlier we were governed by liars, swindlers, and minor thieves. Now we will be governed by minor swindlers and big thieves," he added.

Jan Olszewski announced that he is ready to try to reach agreement with various right-wing forces; this was to be proved by the fact that Stefan Niesiolowski, one of the Christian-National Union leaders, had been invited to the congress. However, before such agreement can be reached, "those who took part in the night shift" [recall of the Olszewski cabinet, which occured at night] must show regret. Olszewski rejected the idea of forming a joint reform camp lead by Lech Walesa. "We have been in the process of reform for the last 50 years and today everything is already reformed."

Participating in the Congress were representatives of the campaign staffs and political forces which endorsed Jan Olszewski during the election campaign: leaders of employees' "Solidarity" structures (unionists of the Ursus factory kept order during the Congress), leadership of the "Rural Solidarity" and of "Solidarity '80" (this trade union, along with [Chairman] Marian Jurczyk, joined the ROP structures), "Fighting Solidarity," "Movement for the Republic," "Movement of the Third Republic," "Polish Action," "Fatherland," and veterans' organizations.

Participants of the congress called upon the Sejm to state officially that the Polish United Workers' Party is a criminal organization. One of the resolutions passed at the congress says that reconstruction of Poland must be based on the social teachings of the Church, and that ROP will firmly object to attempts to liberalize the antiabortion law. ROP will also demand reprivatization and fair privatization. The congress appealed to members of ROP to take part in a demonstration on the day when Kwasniewski's swearing-in ceremony takes place. ROP also adopted a new name: Now it will be called the "Rebirth" Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland.

The ROP administration consists of the following people: Robert Bodnar of the Krakow club of GAZETA POLSKA; Wieslaw Brenski; Stanislaw Gebhardt, an activist of the Christian-Democratic international; Olszewski's press assistant Andrzej Kierylo; Marek Kozdrach; Jacek Kurski, who was responsible for the television campaign; Henryk Lewczuk; Wojciech Sadren; Andrzej Toborowicz, and campaign staff chief Zbigniew Wojciechowski. The political council consists, among others, of Lukasz Czuma, Seweryn Jaworski, Kornel Morawiecki, Jan Parys, Alojzy Szablewski, and Zygmunt Wrzodak. The statute of ROP envisions the possibility of enlarging the movement's leadership. It will probably include representatives of some of the organizations which supported Olszewski, Antoni Macierewicz, and perhaps Roman Bartoszcze. The current leaders will hold their posts only temporarily — until regional structures are formed. These structures will determine the real shape of the ROP.

ZChN Spokesman on UW, Joint Bloc Formation

WS2012091095 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 18 Dec 95 p 4

[Interview with Michal Kaminski, spokesman and member of the Main Administration of the Polish Christian-National Union, by Agata Chroscicka; place and date not given: "Right Wing Splits Into Middle-Class and National Factions; Construction of a Great Triangle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Chroscicka] Supporters of Jan Maria Rokita claimed that his expulsion from the Freedom Union [UW] would be unfavorably received by the right wing, although the party is still declaring that it is willing to open up in this direction. How was the decision of the UW National Council received in the Christian-National Union [ZChN]?

[Kaminski] In my opinion, supporters of Rokita were right in saying this. It is difficult to say that the party is opening up to the right side of the political scene if internal changes within UW do not prove this. In such a situation it is difficult to speak about the real willingness to form a post-August [1980] camp, though it must be admitted that without UW such a camp will certainly be weaker.

[Chroscicka] Jan Rokita spoke about the necessity of building a great triangle. One of its parts is to consist of the national right wing, that is, ZChN. Does such an idea stand a chance of being approved by your party today?

[Kaminski] I really do like this description of the reality; Rokita divided the right wing in Poland into the middle class and liberal part, the unionist part, and the national part. The vision of such a triangle is very desirable. This is proved by the election arithmetic, which shows that such a broad camp would be able to win more parliamentary seats than the post-communists. President Lech Walesa has on several occasions expressed a desire to form such a bloc, and he is the key figure here. Today, along with the transformations in the UW, the vision of such a triangle is becoming increasingly remote. Let me recall, for example, the declarations made by [UW Chairman] Leszek Balcerowicz about platform-based alliances with such parties as ZChN or the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. ZChN will certainly not be a partner of UW if it is to cooperate with the post-communists.

[Chroscicka] Aside from this, are there any other obstacles impeding formation of such a great triangle?

[Kaminski] There are a lot of mutual prejudices in all the potential partners. For example, statements made by Leszek Balcerowicz, in which he says that Jacek Kuron falls under the category of Christian democracy and [ZChN politician] Jan Lopuszanski does not, do not make such an agreement easier. However, with a concrete political platform on the basis of which we will form an alternative to the post-communist's actions, the agreement is closer than it may seem. Let me recall that in may voivodship towns and cities such alliances have proved themselves; wherever UW and ZChN are cooperating, it is clear than we have a joint vision of a regional Poland, where the state and the economy are decentralized and where we will build a civil society. In self-governments people do not discuss ideologies, but specific issues which are often of fundamental importance. On the other hand, the UW has also entered into alliances with the SLD, which we find disturbing. After all, it is difficult to say that a party is forming an anti-communist bloc if, for example, in Warsaw it is sharing power with the SLD. Now, power in Warsaw involves not only resolving minor issues such as paving the streets; it also is a political issue. Such a situation does not enhance the UW's credibility among right-wing voters.

All the people in ZChN agree that our party should remain a sovereign political entity, because we differ quite fundamentally from other right-wing parties. Regardless of this, discussions are under way in ZChN about how this separate character should manifest itself in practice. Should the party function separately from other parties, should it enter some short-term tactical alliances, or should it become part of some permanent political camp?

I would like to quote Gianfranco Fini, who says that even though the Italian right wing consists of many different parties, it is possible to form a joint camp, and its national pillar would be his own party. In Poland we might choose an option in which ZChN would be the national pillar of a broad right-wing bloc. I do not know anyone who would say openly that he is against such a concept. However, incorporation of the UW into this bloc certainly requires a lot of deliberation, especially if we were to include in the bloc the entire UW, along with Zofia Kuratowska, Marek Balicki, or Wladyslaw Frasyniuk.

[Chroscicka] Does this mean that a division of the UW would make formation of such a bloc easier?

[Kaminski] It certainly would. I would not like to encourage the UW to disintegrate, but I believe that such a process would be favorable to the Polish right wing. The configuration of forces on the Polish political scene reflects the divisions which existed in 1990. Now, at the end of the 1990's, the situation is quite different. The UW is a relic of those times. Today many right-wing politicians can see their own mistakes and the oversimplifications they made. UW politicians should also see the mistakes and oversimplifications which they made in the past. Unfortunately, these are not people who are prepared to discuss their mistakes in public.

[Chroscicka] Is ZChN more inclined to cooperate with Solidarity?

[Kaminski] Solidarity has several faces and if we reject prejudices and listen carefully to what Marian Krzaklewski has to say, we will come to the conclusion that Solidarity is far from populism, which might constitute a great obstacle impeding formation of a broad agreement based on the three pillars of the Polish right wing.

[Chroscicka] What role would Lech Walesa play in all this?

[Kaminski] For the electorate of ZChN participation of Lech Walesa is of absolutely paramount importance. The 1995 elections showed that for a Catholic of the national electorate [as published] Lech Walesa is the number-one politician, and ZChN must not ignore this. Walesa is able to unite the centrist electorate and right-wing voters. He guarantees that this broad bloc will be credible to the supporters of its constituent parts. Lech Walesa's desire to form such a broad bloc may be the final argument which will persuade some of my ZChN colleagues to accept it.

[Chroscicka] What do you think the optimistic scenario will look like?

[Kaminski] Formation of a broad bloc. If we look at the situation realistically, we may come to the conclusion that this will be possible only after a split within the UW, and only then will such a bloc be credible. The right side of UW forms a strong middle-class faction along with minor right-wing groups. There is also a Solidarity faction and a national faction. A great triangle with Walesa acting as the godfather is formed. This bloc consolidates after the constitutional referendum, and then after possible powiat [small, currently nonexistent administrative unit which may be reestablished] elections. Then it runs in the parliamentary elections as one, and wins them. In order to win such a victory, however, the bloc must synthesize the right-wing-Solidarity symbols, which still have a great power to influence people's actions, as well as a reasonable conservative platform.

PSL Criticizes Justice Minister, Who May Resign

WS2212144195 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 22 Dec 95 p 4

[Report by (KES, AN, WZ): "On 4 January a Special Session of the Justice Commission Will Be Held; Jaskiernia Must Go"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] is exerting pressure on the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] to recall Jerzy Jaskiernia, justice minister and prosecutor general. According to the peasants, he might be replaced by Aleksander Bentkowski of the PSL. The Sejm Justice Commission is supposed to determine on 4 January whether or not Jaskiernia is purging public prosecutors' offices.

The commission will summon Jaskiernia to ask him about recent developments, about the people who were recalled, Zientek and Smardzeewski, as well as about former Warsaw Prosecutor's Office head Jerzy Labuda, who decided to resign in protest against Zientek's dismissal.

The special session of the commission will be held on the motion submitted by its nine members, representing the Freedom Union, the Union of Labor, and the Confederation for an Independent Poland. The commission is to discuss the dismissals made by Jaskiernia (SLD): Jerzy Zientek, deputy chief of the Warsaw Prosecutor's Office, and Waldemar Smardzewski, head of the prosecutors department in the Justice Ministry. According to the opposition and most prosecutors in Warsaw, the reason why Jaskiernia recalled them was that they had collected material which proved that Kwasniewski broke the anti-corruption law. They believe that there also was another reason: These people wanted the SLD leader's immunity lifted.

The group of the dissatisfied with Minister Jaskiernia now includes the PSL. According to Janusz Piechocinski, there have appeared new factors regarding the motion concerning Prime Minister Oleksy's case, which has been submitted in the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office . "In the atmosphere that surrounds Minister Jaskiernia, any verdict handed down by the prosecutor's office will be put in question," Piechocinski believes. Another PSL deputy says bluntly that "Jaskiernia must go."

At a closed SLD meeting, even some of his club colleagues leveled accusations at Jaskiernia. We have found out unofficially that Jaskiernia is considering the possibility of tendering his resignation even before 4 January.

On 14 December the Sejm — with the votes of the coalition — rejected the vote of no confidence in Jaskiernia. Two weeks earlier the Sejm commission also decided not to back the motion.

Analysis of Postelection Political Scene

96P20164A

[FBIS Media Note] An article in the 6 December GAZETA WYB0RCZA summarized a Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) report that looked at the possible long-term effects of the presidential elections on the political party system, examining the connection between the behavior of the various party electorates in the elections and the parties' support for particular candidates. (A complete copy of the report was published in December by CBOS under BS/207/182/85, "Electorates of the Political Party Electorates in Light of the Presidential Elections.") The analysis is based on data collected from three CBOS surveys between May and November; the last survey, made between 9 and 12 November, included the results of the first round of the election (5 November) and represented 1,254 adult Poles. CBOS noted that this election stimulated great interest and "political liveliness." Voter turnout was the highest since 1989—68 percent.

The CBOS surveys concluded that the victor, Aleksander Kwasniewski of the SLD (Democratic Left Alliance), was able to attract not only "almost all of his party's followers" but also many voters from other groups, something "no other presidential candidate managed to do." In fact, the SLD was the only political group that, from the very beginning of the presidential race, concentrated on one candidate, resulting in steady growth of support from within the SLD electorate: in May, 59 percent of the SLD electorate declared support for Kwasniewski, in September 71 percent, and in November 75 percent. According to the CBOS expert who analyzed the survey results, sociologist Professor Krzysztof Jasiewicz, "no other candidate" was able to garner such substantial backing from a single political group. As a comparison, he notes that, in Lech Walesa's camp, "the most disciplined electorate" was the one based in Solidarity: In May, every fifth Solidarity member expressed a willingness to support Walesa, in September every third, and at the time of the elections in November, 63 percent of Solidarity members planned to support Walesa. However, the report notes, on election day "every fifth person [Solidarity followers]—21 percent—stayed home" in the first round of the elections.

The vote of the right's electorate—which was treated as a whole in the surveys—was divided throughout the elections, with Walesa receiving the backing of 37 percent of the electorate from parties classified as right wing, and Kwasniewski 7 percent in the first round of the elections (5 November).

The second round results—with voters divided into two, almost equal, camps and with the victor winning by 600,000 votes—could bring about profound and permanent changes on the political scene" and could also affect the development of the party system in Poland, according to CBOS experts. Prof. Jasiewicz noted that the survey results provide arguments" that "corroborate" a thesis professed by political scientists in the West that there is a "negative connection between general presidential elections and the formation of a party system" in "young democracies such as Poland." Such elections "may slow down or even halt the process of shaping the party system, especially deepening the already existing political fragmentation." In presidential elections, he notes, one votes for the person, and "this does not favor the building of ties between programs of political parties and the interests of specific groups of the electorate." Because of this fragmentation, Jasiewicz argues, all candidates must seek a broader political base in order to win, reaching beyond their own political party. This forces them, Jasiewicz continues in the full CBOS report, to "present themselves as candidates outside of party lines" [ponadpartyjnyj], which eventually may weaken the candidates' ties to their own respective parties.

With Kwasniewski's success at attracting votes from beyond his own party, it is "no wonder" he won, according to Jasiewicz. Even though Walesa entered the elections without a party of his own and without much societal support, the fact that he was able to mobilize almost half the electorate must be regarded "as his great success." Although Jasiewicz is skeptical as to what degree this mobilization of support will actually serve to reconstruct the political scene in Poland, he notes in conclusion that the readiness on the part of the right to unite behind a single presidential candidate may perhaps translate into a "striving toward integration and cooperation among the right-wing parties in the future."

Outgoing Minister: Army Not Involved in Politics

LD2212152395 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1435 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 22 Dec—According to Defense Minister Zbigniew W. Okonski, who bade farewell to the Army today, there is no atmosphere of tension in the Army at present in connection with the political confusion in the country. "There is expectation and nervousness, like in the whole of society. There are no states of heightened battle readiness," Okonski assured journalists.

In Okonski's opinion, the success of the young Polish democracy is, among other things, that the Army does not concern itself with these matters, and they will be resolved by the competent authorities, constitutionally set up for the purpose. "The Army is carrying out its everyday tasks and will absolutely not get involved in this," the minister added. [passage omitted]

Central Planning Office Sums Up 1995 Economy

WS2112155595 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 21 Dec 95 p 16

[Report by Bogdan Kowalski: "Central Planning Office: Incomplete 1995 Balance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Was the passing year good for the economy? The Central Planning Office [CUP] claims it was. Production, salaries and private savings grew, but so did the foreign trade deficit and public debts. The housing construction industry collapsed.*

CUP has just published an updated report discussing the state of the economy after the first eleven months of the current year.

Production and Housing

In comparison with the same 11 months of 1994, industrial production rose by 9.7 percent. A high growth of 15 percent was noted in the construction industry. CUP claims we owe this to a high demand for investments and modernization.

This year's results in the housing industry, however, are truly disastrous. Over 11 months, only 45,900 new apartments were built — 80 percent of what was built during the corresponding months of the previous year. CUP expects that by 31 December the number of new apartments will rise to 60,000 (in 1994, which was not a good year for the housing industry, more than 76,000 new apartments were built).

Economic Growth

Private and state companies alike are enjoying economic growth. Over the first 10 months of the year, their revenues totalled 335 billion zlotys [Z] and were higher than those attained last year by a real value of 11.2 percent. There are other figures indicating economic growth:

— gross profit (before taxation) from all production, service, and trade companies amounted to Z16.4 billion — 12.3 percent higher than in 1994;

— net profit was Z8.7 billion — 12.3 percent higher than in 1994 (which was possible because of tax cuts);

— private companies made 2.6 times more profit than in the previous year. Moreover, as much as 42.7 percent of revenue on economic activity was generated in the private sector;

— 62 percent of all the production and trade companies made a net profit.

Trade and Debts

Foreign trade is flourishing. By the end of October, revenues on exports came to $18.808 billion and exceeded last year's by 37.6 percent. Exports grew despite the fact that exporters were dissatisfied with the strengthening of the rate of the zloty against the dollar and other currencies. The value of imports was nearly Z20 billion — 40.5 percent more than a year ago. However, the deficit in the turnover of goods was more than twice as high than after the first 10 months of 1994 — it came to $1.109 billion.

On 31 October, our foreign debt totaled $44.3 billion and — despite the fact that all payments had been made on schedule — it was $2.1 billion higher than in the end of 1994. CUP claims this is largely due to changes of the exchange rate. Over the initial 10 months of this year we repaid more than $1.947 billion, mainly to the Paris Club.

Savings and Earnings

On 30 November, household savings were nearly Z77 billion. In the first 11 months, they grew by 15.8 percent in real terms. We currently prefer to save in zlotys. One year ago, the number of people who saved in zlotys was the same as those who preferred foreign currencies.

Earnings in industrial companies rose by a nominal value of 29.3 percent. The average gross salary was Z863. After the first 11 months, salaries in the production plants rose by 3.7 percent, retirement pensions — by 2.8 percent, and pensions for farmers — by 3.5 percent.

Federal

'Purpose' of IFOR Deployment in Bosnia Viewed

AU2612203695 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Milan Misic: "From UNPROFOR to IFOR"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The diplomats have finished their part of the job and handed the mission to the soldiers. Peace in Bosnia has been ratified and now it has to be implemented.

This implementation began with a modest ceremony at the fog-enveloped Sarajevo airport, marking the end of the three-and-a-half-year mandate of the much maligned UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], and the start of the one-year mission of the already much praised IFOR [Implementation Force].

The blue helmets with UN insignia have been replaced by green ones bearing the symbol of NATO, the most powerful military alliance known in history. The lightly armed UN forces played the role of "peacekeepers" in the conditions of a brutal and chaotic war, while NATO soldiers have been arriving in full combat gear now that the guns of the warring sides are beginning to cool off following the establishment of peace.

"The new sheriff in town" believes that he will succeed because, among other things, he will use the experience of the old one and because he has a clearer aim and more adequate means at his disposal.

The UNPROFOR mission has been assessed as unsuccessful but for completely wrong reasons. The main criticism was that it failed to halt "the Serb aggression," to prevent "ethnic cleansing," to protect "the safe zones," and many other things in the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II.

However, it would be hard to deny that UNPROFOR did the maximum possible and the maximum realistic given the circumstances of its deployment. Its mission was primarily humanitarian but it was also versatile. The blue helmets were given too many tasks with too few means to carry them out. In any case, it was not a combat force, hence the impression of its ineffectiveness, as well as many traps and even humiliation, starting from the time the Bosnian Serbs tied them to posts, to the recent Muslim looting of the Bangladeshi base as they were preparing to go home.

UNPROFOR was on "mission impossible" also because its mandate was defined by some 40 UN Security Council resolutions, many of which were contradictory. The soldiers were given civilian chiefs, and when NATO was called in to help, the dual key system was in force, and so on. The impression that the UN had failed was also created, as one official said, because of its failure to meet the hysterical demands created in the global public that "the Serbs should be punished."

IFOR has three key advantages—the peace agreement, a clear military mandate, and an impressive military force. The peace agreement has adjusted the moral sermons of the outside world to the Bosnian realities. The mandate is to keep the former adversaries physically apart long enough for them to understand the stupidity and futility of renewed war, and thus create the conditions for the start of the reconstruction. The military force will be on the ready to discourage potential saboteurs.

However, the Balkan intervention by NATO, and particularly the deployment of the troops of the leader of this alliance, the United States, has been accompanied by serious debates as to its rationality and purpose. The controversies are not insignificant, and the fears are considerable. The U.S. President is gambling his chances for reelection with this operation, and NATO in Bosnia is supposed to be resurrected from a Cold War defensive alliance on its deathbed to regional policemen. Many things are uncertain, and hence great expectations and even greater anxiety. As the U.S. defense secretary said: "Success will be hard, but failure would be catastrophic."

Tajik Prime Minister Arrives in Belgrade

LD2612183595 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 26 Dec (TANJUG)—At the invitation of Federal Prime Minister Dr. Radoje Kontic, Tajikistan's Prime Minister Jamshed Karimov, along with his aides, arrived this afternoon on a visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federal Secretariat for Information announced.

Minister Kontic and other members of the Yugoslav delegation greeted the eminent guest from the friendly country at Surcin Airport.

This is the first visit by a high-ranking Tajik official to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since this former Soviet republic gained its independence.

It is believed that this visit will contribute to the strengthening of interstate relations, especially in economic cooperation.

Immediately after their arrival in Belgrade, the Tajik delegation, whose members include the managers of several economic enterprises, held a working meeting with Yugoslav businessmen. It was stated that economic entities of the two countries are open to more frequent contacts and more dynamic cooperation in all areas of mutual interest.

Taking part in the talks on the Yugoslav side were Dr. Janko Radulovic, federal minister for development, science, and environment, and Federal Minister for Commerce Djordje Siradinovic, the announcement of the Federal Secretariat for Information concludes.

Economic Cooperation To Expand

LD2212205195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2004 GMT 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec 22 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Jovan Zebic and a visiting Tajik state and economic delegation noted Friday that bilateral cooperation could be expanded through signing of inter-state agreements.

They also noted that the economies of the two countries were complementary and that both countries would benefit from cooperation in the fields of energy, agriculture, textile and chemical industries, construction and metal industries, Yugoslav information secretariat said in a statement.

Vice-President of Yugoslav Chamber of Economy Danilo Perovic and head of the Tajik delegation Alisher Tadjiyev [name as received] Friday announced that an agreement on economic cooperation would be concluded.

The Yugoslav-Tajik Central Bank, with 65 percent Yugoslav capital, will from now on follow up business deals between the two countries, Tajik delegation head said.

The two countries will mainly trade in raw matarials and some finished products, he said.

Tajikistan can export silver, bismuth, antinomy, marble and aluminum and wants to import furnishing fabrics and furniture, equipment for textile industry and cables from Yugoslavia.

Serbia

Opposition Parties To Form 'Parallel Parliament'

AU2712091095 Paris AFP in English 0741 GMT 27 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec 27 (AFP)—Five parties in the Serbian parliament opposed to President Slobodan Milosevic on Tuesday decided to form a "parallel parliament" after the ruling party refused to allow live transmission of parliamentary debate.

The independent FoNet news agency said the decision was taken by Vuk Draskovic of the Serbian Renewal Party, Vesna Pesic of the Civic Alliance, Tomislav Nikolic of the Serbian Radical Party, Zoran Djindjic of the Democratic Party, Vojislav Kostunica of the Serbian Democratic Party and Andras Agostan of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians.

The five held their first session in the parliamentary press center, but Draskovic also vowed that the group would meet in the "open air" outside the parliament.

"In the absence of television we will broadcast directly to the people," he said, adding that one of the objectives of the parallel parliament would be to put together an opposition list to oppose the ruling—and ex-communist—Serbian Socialist Party.

"The idea of a parallel parliament will surely lead to the creation of a parallel government," said Draskovic.

Montenegreo

Yugoslav Army Officers' Appointments Reported

AU2512204795 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 22 Dec 95 p 7

[Report by V.J., P.B.: "Martinovic Replaces Mrksic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Major General Radosav Martinovic (Serb from Kosovo, 42 years old), former head of the staff of the 2d Army in Podgorica, in the past several months took up the duty of assistant chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, assistant to Colonel General Momcilo Perisic. Until last May, this post was occupied by Colonel General Mile Mrksic, later the commander of the Krajina Army.

With this appointment, Gen. Martinovic has in fact taken on himself the role of the first operations officer of the General Staff and has taken control over the Special Purpose Corps of the Yugoslav Army.

Major General Milorad Obradovic, formerly commander of the Podgorica Corps, has been appointed head of the staff of the 2d Army, and Colonel Tripko Cecovic, formerly head of the military school in Belgrade, was appointed commander of the Podgorica Corps.

Lieutenant General Bozidar Babic remains at the post of commander of the 2d Army until further notice, and Colonel Veselin Sljivancanin remains commander of the strongest formation in Montenegro—the 5th Motorized Brigade in Podgorica (the Masline Barracks).

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